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<\/figure>\n\n\n\nYu Feng, a Taiwanese-flagged fishing vessel suspected of illegal fishing activity – USN<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n The term IUU fishing was officially adopted in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 2001 International Plan of Action to Prevent IUU, though the practices themselves preceded this.<\/span>1<\/sup><\/a><\/span>. The FAO plan was the first major international initiative to deter and eliminate IUU fishing, and has been recognised by various institutions such as the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), G8, WWF,<\/span>2<\/sup><\/a><\/span> and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).<\/span>3<\/sup><\/a><\/span> Due to the significant impact of the issue, the UN Secretary General identified IUU fishing as one of the seven main threats to maritime security.<\/span>4<\/sup><\/a><\/span> <\/p>\n\n\n\n Regional organisations followed suit. These include the African Union,<\/span>5<\/sup><\/a><\/span> who identified IUU fishing as a significant issue within their 2050 Integrated Maritime strategy, the European Union through their Regulation to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing,<\/span>6<\/sup><\/a><\/span> and ASEAN, who have recently established the ASEAN Network for combatting IUU fishing.<\/span>7<\/sup><\/a><\/span> The ‘Quad’ (USA, Japan, India and Australia) in the Indo-Pacific has also centred IUU Fishing in its activities.<\/span>8<\/sup><\/a><\/span> <\/p>\n\n\n\n IUU fishing has been recognised as a key priority by most individual coastal states too (see for example the US,<\/span>9<\/sup><\/a><\/span> the UK<\/span>10<\/sup><\/a><\/span>, and Australia<\/span>11<\/sup><\/a><\/span>). There has also being a burgeoning academic interest in IUU fishing.<\/span>12<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing encompasses a broad array of practices centred on the evasion and avoidance of global and domestic fisheries management arrangements and legislation, as well as conservation regulations within and beyond national jurisdiction. Following the definition of the FAO:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Unreported fishing comprises activities: <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/strong>Unregulated fishing <\/strong>takes place: <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Common IUU fishing practices include: fishing in a country\u2019s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) without a license; vessels with dual flags; vessels circumventing regulations through Flags of Convenience; fishing non-permitted species; unlicensed border hopping; fishing above quota; fishing in prohibited areas (such as Marine Protected Areas); vessels with false flags; fishing in RFMO without license; fishing with illegal gear or using illegal means; transhipment without authorization; fishing out of season; misreporting catches; not reporting catches; the dumping of fish and retaining only of \u2018high grading\u2019 fish; and failure to operate Vessel Monitoring System.<\/span>13<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n Much work has been conducted on the causes of IUU fishing. Explanations relating to an assumption of economic self-interest are prevalent.<\/span>14<\/sup><\/a><\/span> These include economic incentives arising from the abundance of a valuable commercial species in a particular place or at a particular time, or a lack of expected sanctions.<\/span>15<\/sup><\/a><\/span> As the Marine Resources Assessment Group highlights, legal and illegal fishers may sell to the same markets, but legal operators face the burden of increased costs of meeting regulations (such as minimizing long-line vessel lines to reduce by-catch), while illegal fishers face fewer overhead costs (as well as potentially evading tax).<\/span>16<\/sup><\/a><\/span> <\/p>\n\n\n\n Economic hardship can also be an important \u2018push\u2019 factor towards illegal practices, particularly in small fishing communities.<\/span>17<\/sup><\/a><\/span> If a community is generally impoverished, it has been shown to contribute to IUU fishing as a result of a \u2018scarcity mindset\u2019, whereby short-term needs legitimise (in the mind of the perpetrator) illicit activities that may cause long-term impacts. One example offered is the poaching of trochus in Australian waters by impoverished Indonesian fishers. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Economic self-interest explanations have been criticised for not recognising the facilitating political and social context in which IUU fishing takes place.<\/span>18<\/sup><\/a><\/span> Battista et al., for example, argue that the moral, societal, and cultural factors affecting IUU fishing behaviour are also importance \u2013 especially for smaller scale activities by local community actors. <\/span>19<\/sup><\/a><\/span> They argue that IUU can be driven not only by self-interest, but also feelings of entitlement over the resource, a desire to retain a sense of identity or tradition, protests against the existing rules (perceived as illegitimate or oppressive)<\/span>20<\/sup><\/a><\/span> or enforcers (perceived as corrupt),<\/span>21<\/sup><\/a><\/span> coercive enrolment, a lack of information and beliefs it is victimless, and consequent moral norms of acceptance within fishing communities. Legitimacy and trust in regulations may also be undermined when violations occur often, weakening a sense of obligation to continue following such measures.<\/span>22<\/sup><\/a><\/span> As Osterblom et al. argues, governments can create market vacuums, the state may not be perceived as legitimate, and crime offer a solution for those who cannot depend on alternative livelihoods. <\/span>23<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n IUU fishing includes both serious and minor offences, with perpetrators ranging from organized criminal groups to otherwise legitimate commercial vessels or artisanal fishers.<\/span>24<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n As Vrancken et al. argue, IUU is commonly considered as a fisheries management issue as much as a criminal one.<\/span>25<\/sup><\/a><\/span> IUU violations are often treated as administrative contraventions or occurring as a result of regulatory gaps, weak and uneven governance in the management of fisheries (or in areas without fisheries management), and insufficient levels of sanctions (such as fines). Subsidy provision leading to over-capacity of fleet or quotas in the face of increasing demand and falling stocks have also been highlighted as management issues.<\/span>26<\/sup><\/a><\/span>Rather than being explicitly criminal, IUU in this sense is seen as comprising relatively minor opportunistic infractions by individuals, artisanal fishers, or otherwise legitimate fishing businesses in areas with poor fisheries management or problems of legitimacy perception, made on the above bases of economic calculation and social context.<\/span>27<\/sup><\/a><\/span> <\/p>\n\n\n\n However, evidence of the organised and purposive nature of many IUU fishing activities has increasingly led to its treatment as a form of transnational organised crime at sea.<\/span>28<\/sup><\/a><\/span> The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) argue that organised crime in the fisheries sector is likely to become more prevalent as fish become more scarce and so more valuable.<\/span>29<\/sup><\/a><\/span> This is in line with evidence showing that illegal fishing activities have increased significantly in recent years, and that much of this activity is highly organised and explicitly profit-driven, perpetrated by organisations with strong links to other forms of serious crime such as drugs trafficking and forced labour.<\/span>30<\/sup><\/a><\/span> IUU fishing has also been linked to notions of \u2018green crime\u2019; that is crimes that cause significant environmental harm, even if not technically illegal.<\/span>31<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n IUU fishing is recognised as a criminal activity by multiple international organisations and agencies. These including the UN General Assembly,<\/span>32<\/sup><\/a><\/span> the FAO, <\/span>33<\/sup><\/a><\/span> the UNODC (who brand it a \u2018marine living resources crime\u2019),<\/span>34<\/sup><\/a><\/span> and Interpol.<\/span>35<\/sup><\/a><\/span> NGOs such as WWF also refer to IUU in their efforts to improve and universalise enforcement over criminal harm to marine living resources.<\/span>36<\/sup><\/a><\/span> <\/p>\n\n\n\n IUU fishing is increasingly characterised as a security issue within academia,<\/span>37<\/sup><\/a><\/span> as well as by various international, regional, and non-governmental organisations,<\/span>38<\/sup><\/a><\/span> and by many states. IUU fishing can have significant impacts socio-economic effects on populations who depend on fish for their livelihoods and sustenance.<\/span>39<\/sup><\/a><\/span> It can also cause further insecurity through linked crimes. Glaser et al. argue, for example, IUU fishing in Somalia resulted in some former local fishers turning to piracy, including – initially at least – targeting IUU fishing vessels that they considered to be legitimate targets <\/span>40<\/sup><\/a><\/span> DeSombre argues that IUU fishing, through depletion and eco-system damage, may intensify disputes over island territories in order to ensure access to fishery resources.<\/span>41<\/sup><\/a><\/span> IUU fishers have been used by states to attempt to secure access to greater fishery resources. China for example has been accused of pursuing this strategy in the South China Sea. <\/p>\n\n\n\n While there is general agreement that IUU fishing is increasing,<\/span>42<\/sup><\/a><\/span> there are various estimates on the scope of the issue. Assessments are complicated by the use of different measures, as well as the broad array of activities \u2013 many of them clandestine \u2013 that constitute IUU fishing practices. As such, data on the frequency and degree of the problem remains limited or is based on best guess estimates. <\/span>43<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n One measure of the overall impact of IUU has been to estimate catch sizes. The US National Intelligence Council, for example, suggest that IUU accounts for one third of the total global catch, based on data extrapolated from well-documented fisheries.<\/span>44<\/sup><\/a><\/span> The Environmental Justice Foundation argue that at least 15% – 11 to 26 million tons annually \u2013 of the global catch is taken through IUU fishing.<\/span>45<\/sup><\/a><\/span> In Europe, 40-60% of seafood catch is linked to IUU activity. <\/span>46<\/sup><\/a><\/span> Other studies suggest that a quarter of the global landed value of fish is taken through IUU activities.<\/span>47<\/sup><\/a><\/span> <\/p>\n\n\n\n A second measure through which to assess the scope of IUU fishing is the financial cost it incurs through losses to legitimate actors such as states. Agnew et al., in a much-cited paper, estimate the annual cost to the legitimate global economy is between USD 10 and 24 billion. <\/span>48<\/sup><\/a><\/span> In the Eastern Central Atlantic, this loss has been assessed at between USD 828 million and 1.6 billion annually.<\/span>49<\/sup><\/a><\/span> Liddick suggests that USD 2 to 5 billion dollars are lost by developing nations every year as a result of IUU fishing. <\/span>50<\/sup><\/a><\/span> <\/p>\n\n\n\n Case studies demonstrate that IUU fishing is prevalent in all regions in the world, including in coastal areas, the Exclusive Economic Areas (EEZs) of states and on the High Seas. While there is significant variation in both the level and trend of IUU catches across regions, it is clear that IUU is global in scope.<\/span>51<\/sup><\/a><\/span> These claims are supported by the Global Initiative’s IUU Fishing Index.<\/span>52<\/sup><\/a><\/span> <\/p>\n\n\n\n These difficulties of measurement have resulted in some novel alternative approaches. Platforms such as Spyglass, Global Fishing Watch, and Project Eyes on the Sea for example, rely partly on shared information in order to track illegal vessels and their activities. <\/span>53<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n
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