Pragmatic spaces and the maritime security agenda

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Abstract: *The oceans are increasingly understood as a security space. Does the new maritime security agenda lead to new spatial configurations? This chapter introduces the concept of 'pragmatic spaces' to explore spatial configurations produced in responses to maritime security. Four exemplary spaces are discussed: how counter-piracy led to the development of high risk areas, how maritime security capacity building produced new regions constructed through codes of conduct, how the identification of smuggling routes established new forms of international partnerships, and how maritime domain awareness systems advance new transnational spaces of surveillance. These new spatial configurations were introduced to manage maritime security issues and enable transnational forms of governance.*

Introduction

The rise of the maritime security agenda in the light of global security issues, such as piracy, extremist violence, smuggling or illegal fishing has led to profoundly new thinking about the oceans. In this chapter I ask in what ways the new maritime security agenda is productive of ocean spaces and novel spatial thinking. Identifying a range of examples of new spaces, the chapter shows how these spatialities enable different forms of governance and international collaboration.

Traditionally the seas have been understood as governed through a dual approach as laid out in the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in which the oceans are either subjected to a zone or governed by the idea of the free seas (Tanaka 2016, Steinberg 2011). The chapter adds further evidence to the observation of a proliferation of third types of spaces (Ryan 2013, Bremner 2013). These are neither territorial (belonging to a distinct nation state), nor global and free. They are constructed through largely technical practices of surveillance, policing and protection. These zones are here discussed as "pragmatic spaces", reflecting spatial ideas that have been discussed through the concepts of "assemblage" (Allen and Cochrane 2007, Müller 2015), "technological zones" (Barry 2006), or "zones of exception" (Ong 2006).

I start out with some general considerations concerning the contours and character of the maritime security agenda and a speculation how security is linked to the production of space. I then review a number of empirical examples. Firstly, I discuss the case of piracy off the coast of Somalia, and how counter-piracy operations produced a new kind of maritime space, the so-called High-Risk Area, and associated with it, a new type of map. I then turn to the production of maritime regions as the

outcomes of maritime security politics drawing on the case of two regional codes of conduct. Next, I review a type of space that is constructed through the consideration of a smuggling route, the so-called Southern Route for Afghan Heroin, and investigate the form of international cooperation (the Southern Route Partnership) it spurs. Finally, I turn to a more technological zone. The so-called Areas of Interest and Common Operating Pictures as they are established in recent maritime domain awareness structures. I show how maritime surveillance projects lead to a new form of representing ocean space. In summary, the chapter points to several new empirical examples of spaces which are the effect of the maritime security agenda.

The oceans and the new maritime security agenda

A conventional reading of the governance of the oceans is that of a dual approach established through the conclusion of UNCLOS. Following the convention, the sea is governed through two major types of spatial construction: spaces which are under governance of nation states (the territorial sea and the 200 nm Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)) and a global space of the high seas (Tanaka 2016, Steinberg 2011). This dual approach has increasingly been challenged by researchers who document how several additional legal regimes also provide governance spaces. This includes the zones established by the search and rescue regime (Aalberts and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2014; Bremner 2015), by international fishery management organisations (Sydnes 2002) or safety zones to protect offshore installations (Pesch 2015). Increasingly, we are gaining an understanding of the oceans as a space consisting of various multiple overlapping zones of governance.

Adding to this discussion, the starting point of the following observations is that it is not only or primarily legal regimes that constitute such spaces. The cases of spatiality investigated below are constituted by security practices rather than legal practices. With the term “security practices”, I refer to patterns of doings and sayings organised by a distinct problematisation of issues as ‘security problems’ often involving instruments of the military or police (Bueger 2016).

Since at least the 1940s, security practices have been primarily concerned about national security and the territorial integrity of the nation state. For the oceans this has implied thinking of them as territory whose integrity needs to be protected and controlled through varieties of the military instrument, in particular navies (see also Depledge, this collection). This ‘seapower’ thinking focuses on how to control sea territory, how to deny its use by an adversary, and how to project power (Till 2004). National security practices led to the constructions of ocean space as partial sovereign territory, but also regarding it as a range of focal point of particular strategic significance for national economy and trade, as expressed in conceptions such as ‘sea lines of communication’ or ‘chokepoints’.

Together with the general revolution in security thinking which implies a wider and broader focus on other objects and actors than the nation state, security at sea is increasing understood through the concept of maritime security. While in many ways fuzzy as a concept (Bueger 2015), maritime security stands for significant attention given to transnational issues such as maritime terrorism, piracy, smuggling or various forms of other crimes at sea since the early 2000s. A good indicator for the salience of these issues is the agenda of the UN Security Council. As Wilson (2018) notes, between 2008 and 2017 the Security Council adopted 50 resolutions related to maritime security, implying no less than one new resolution every 2.5 months. The majority of global security actors

have devoted, since the mid-2000s, substantial resources for maritime security for patrolling, interceptions, or capacity building. As argued by Bueger and Edmunds (2017), the rise of maritime security and the new emphasis on it by states as well as regional organisations indicate the emergence of new thinking about security at sea and that maritime space is increasingly problematised from a security perspective. What kind of spaces is maritime security productive of?

The spaces discussed in the chapter are all productions of maritime security practices. They are here, moreover, considered as "pragmatic spaces". With this concept I refer to spaces created to address a particular securitized problem and to develop special regulatory regimes, forms of measurement and other technical responses.[i] The concept of pragmatic spaces can be usefully contrasted with a range of other closely related concepts: assemblage, technological zones, and zones of exception.

Similar to recent notions of "assemblage", the notion of pragmatic spaces, aims at a relational, process-oriented understanding of space as an effect of symbolic and material activities (Allen and Cochrane 2007, Müller 2015, Bueger 2018). Humans and non-humans are given equal weight. Understanding how space is produced and performed is the primary objective. Assemblage is a general concept and structural metaphor. The concept grasps wholes of heterogenous parts and as such operate son a very generic level. To speak of pragmatic spaces, by contrast, is to refer to a distinct kind of, or sub-set of assemblages that is arising in the context of responding to a particular problem or fixing a certain concern. Pragmatic spaces are particular kind of assemblages made to respond to a problem and address a particular issue. This brings the concept close to what Andrew Barry (2006) calls "technological zones". For Barry these are spaces constituted by distinct regimes of regulation and measurement (Barry 2006). As he argues, such zones are often characterized by the lack of territorial reference or representation. In contrast, many of the spaces discussed in the following are represented on maps and in other artefacts as distinct territories.

Another concept of space that offers similarities are works that discuss "zones of exception". As discussed in anthropology, such zones are temporary fixations of extra-ordinary rules in order to allow for neoliberal practices (Ong 2006) or the global circulation of goods (Cohen 2014). Such spatialities share with the notion of pragmatic spaces the limited temporality and problem orientation. Yet, pragmatic spaces not necessarily imply the exception from rules, but often are just a re-interpretation or complementation of existing rules.

In the following I use the concept of pragmatic spaces – as differing from Assemblage or "zones of exception" – as an open sensitizing concept to discuss the emergence, performance and stabilization of spaces that have emerged in response to maritime security concerns. I discuss four kinds of such pragmatic spaces, each of which reveals different features and trajectories.

Piracy and High-Risk Areas

When piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia escalated from 2008 to levels that required international security actions, new maritime security spaces were created to organise and

coordinate the response. Two spatial configurations became the most important means: a transit corridor and a high-risk area.

The international naval coalitions that started to respond to piracy in the area installed, as one of the first operational measures, the so-called International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC). The corridor aimed at offering better protection for merchant and recreational vessels against piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden, close to Somali shores. The establishment of the corridor was endorsed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Transiting vessels were asked to register in advance with the EU's Maritime Security Center Horn of Africa (MSC-HoA) and to transit at agreed times. As Deborah Cowen (2014:153) argues, "the creation of this corridor is literally the production of a new political space" since it establishes new forms of authority and legal regulations.

The IRTC was also calculated space. It was based on operational analysis – "including spatial analysis of piracy attacks; forecasting of piracy risk based on historical rates of attack, density of traffic and weather conditions; and definition of patrol areas" (MacLeod and Wadrop 2015: 3). Feeding this kind of data to algorithms, allowed the naval coalitions to maximize the amount of surveyed traffic, while minimizing the overall mission costs (Fabbri et al 2015: 5). It also significantly reduced the response time of navies to any incident, as described by two operational analysts working in one of the counter-piracy missions:

> *A simple model was developed to calculate the recommended patrol area size. The method was based on the need for coverage of the patrol area to be dense enough that a military asset would be able to intervene within a critical time period from the start of an attack. The process would involve the warship receiving a distress call from a merchant vessel, then directing a helicopter to the vessel's position. On arrival warning shots were expected to be sufficient to deter the attack. The dimensions of the patrol boxes allowed a typical helicopter to reach the targeted vessel within 30 minutes of a distress call. The warship often could subsequently intercept the pirate vessel.*
> *(MacLeod and Wadrop 2015: 3)*

The corridor proved effective. Yet, pirates simply moved their operations out further into the Indian Ocean. This necessitated further measures and led to the construction of an additional space complementing the IRTC. In a historically unique constellation of actors, the international shipping associations started a discussion with the IMO, Interpol, naval operations and maritime crime experts in order to identify how shipping could be better protected (Hansen 2012). This led to a series of guidance documents for the shipping industry, known as Best Management Practices (BMP). The first version was published in 2009, with a series of revised edition published over the years. Starting from version three, the spatial construct of a High Risk Area was introduced. As the document describes it, "the High Risk Area for piracy attacks defines itself by where the piracy attacks have taken place. For the purpose of the BMP, this is an area bounded by Suez to the North, 10 degree South and 78 degree East."[ii] This area, in essence, comprised of all of the Western Indian Ocean. It was the space in which the shipping industry should apply the guidelines. The BMP prescribe situational measures including, pre- and post-boarding measures and vessel hardening measures (e.g. barb wire, or additional lookouts). At the heart of the BMP is, however, the close coordination between the shipping industry and naval actors. According to the document, a transiting vessel is to report to the MSC-HoA which could assess the risk of a

particular vessel, track it while in transit through the area, and pass on this information to the naval headquarters coordinating the counter-piracy missions.

The BMP and with it the HRA, while not legally binding were endorsed by several international bodies. This included the UN Security Council and a series of states through a declaration and the informal global governance body addressing piracy: the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. In this sense the HRA became the core spatial definition for the area in which the fight against piracy would take place. A unique set of relations between industry, navies, states and international organizations stabilised it as such (Bueger 2018). The status of the HRA was re-enforced through a series of material inscriptions and representations. Print copies of the BMP were produced in a pocket-size format, thousands of copies distributed for free and a movie produced to be used in training of seafarers. Moreover, a new type of map was produced for the promulgation of the BMP.

The United Kingdom's Hydrographic Office (UKHO), an executive agency of the UK's Department of Defence in providing navigational aids, published a chart that marked the borders of the HRA in red colors. The chart also listed the core content of the BMP including the contact details for where shippers should register. The map was initially called the “Anti-Piracy Planning Chart” and later renamed to the “Maritime Security Chart Q6099 - Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea”. The map is noteworthy in that it was the first map produced by the office that, as it explicitly states on the chart, should not be used for navigation. It also created an entirely new genre of charts, maritime security charts, or the so-called Q Series that contain “Security Related Information to Mariners”.[iii] A series of similar maps were produced for the Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, Karachi to Hong Kong, Singapore to Papua New Guinea, and West Africa including Gulf of Guinea. Each of these marks a high-risk area, lists guidelines for shippers as well as contact details for reporting centers.

HRAs, although inscribed in maps, are fragile spaces in the sense that they are frequently reviewed. Indeed, the original HRA has been, in recent years, frequently revised and with it the map. They are also contested spaces. The category of risk is dependent on epistemic work, but also the ownership and authority to define that risk is contested. The size of the HRA in the Western Indian Ocean has been a frequent source of controversy (Bueger 2018). In particular, countries whose territorial sea is part of the HRA have questioned the authority of the maps. They argued that representation of their waters as risky has consequences for trade volumes and also insurance premiums, since insurers, such as the Lloyds War Committee, use HRAs as a reference point in defining war risk zones.

Hence, the problem of how to protect shipping from piracy incidents and improve naval operational coordination in the Western Indian Ocean, established new spatialities – transit corridors and High Risk Areas. These, in turn, became used across different regions and shipping lanes, became manifested and represented in a new genre of maps.

Insecurity, capacity building and new maritime regions

Regions are not only the outcome of social practices and institutionalization processes (Paasi

2004, 2009), but also of distinct political strategies that empower certain actors and allow them to participate in governance processes differently (Gruby and Campbell 2013). Gruby and Campbell (2013) for instance, describe the case of the Pacific Region. As they argue, it is a region that has been deliberately 'performed' to enable the small islands of the Pacific to strengthen their position within environmental governance.

In interesting ways, maritime security practice is productive of spaces that can also be understood as a means by which regions empower particular actors. The international response to piracy reveals several such instances. Starting from 2008, the IMO facilitated an agreement through which countries in the vicinity of Somalia would be better positioned to share information about piracy and organize joint capacity building activities (Warbrick, McGoldrick and Guilfoyle 2008; Menzel 2018). The Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, known as the Djibouti Code of Conduct, was signed in 2009. It brought together a unique combination of countries with little prior official relations or cooperation experience: Southern and Eastern African states and the states of the Arabian Peninsula. In sum, it created a new region.

The non-legally binding code contained a commitment to cooperate in addressing piracy and installed a regional architecture of information sharing centres and a training center. In practice the Code provided primarily a framework for technical cooperation between the states of the region and the IMO's Maritime Safety Division. In particular, training and workshops on maritime surveillance and data analysis were organised. Although the new regional construct did not develop many genuine forms of interactions outside the capacity building work of the IMO and other international actors, it was further institutionalized. In 2016 the participatory states signed an amendment that broadened the focus of the Code to include other maritime crimes than piracy. It also included a provision to consider turning the code into a legally binding instrument. Hence, the ongoing capacity building work of the IMO led to the stabilisation of this new regional construct. States were incentivised to use the regional structure given the financial and resource benefits they would receive from participating in it.

When a piracy-related crisis situation started to evolve in West Africa a similar spatial construct was developed. The IMO facilitated a regional agreement, directly copying provisions from the Djibouti Code (Ralby 2017). The Yaoundé Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa was signed in June 2013 and came to be known as the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. Similar to the case of the Djibouti Code, a unique range of states was assembled to form a region. In contrast to the Dijbouti Code the region was formed as a supra-entity providing an umbrella for work that was already carried out within existing regional organisations (Ralby 2017). The signatory states of the Code are the members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC). Going beyond the focus on piracy and aiming to addressing other maritime crimes as well, the primary goal of the region was to increase regional cooperation as well as information sharing. For that purpose, an Interregional Coordination Center was created; the region was split into several technical subzones, named alphabetically (zones A-G, but omitting B and C), with each having a new Maritime Operations centre. A complex region was created including a

range of technical zones. Again, the primary problem that the region addressed was to build the capacity of countries so that they would be able to respond to and prevent piracy incidents to occur.

Both of the spatial constructs are new regions produced in maritime security practice. The regions were created through inter-state agreement and brought to life through information sharing centers and regular capacity building activities organized by international actors. As regions, they placed – in particular – the IMO into the centre of attention, and situated this civil international organization as a core maritime security actor.

Smuggling, routes and partnerships

In 2014 the UN Office on Drugs and Crime's (UNODC) Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP) initiated a forum for law enforcement officials from the Indian Ocean region. The basis was a joint proposal by Australia, Seychelles, Tanzania, Sri Lanka and the US-led Combined Maritime Forces.[iv] The core objective of the regional forum was to facilitate information sharing between officials, in particular prosecutors, but also to organise joint capacity building and training activities. The so-called Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime meets on a regular basis in different formats. It is organised in working groups related to three issues (narcotics, fishery crime, and regional sanction violations), as well as a cross-cutting prosecutors' network. As one of the most successful offspring of the forum, in 2016 an agreement was signed which institutionalised the working group on narcotics as the so-called Southern Route Partnership.

The spatial reference is here the concept of 'routes'. The partnership is structured through the route that smugglers are using to transport narcotics. The Southern Route is a colloquial term that drug enforcement practitioners and analysts have started to employ to refer to the smuggling of Afghan opiates through the Indian Ocean. In particular, the analytical work of UNODC and the collation of seizure data has made this route visible. The UNODC World Drug Report for 2015 lists the southern route as one of the main three routes for Afghan opiates, defining it as "southwards through Iran or Pakistan" (UNODC 2015: 43). As one of the UNODC reports, prepared for the first major meeting of the partnership states:

> *The route to the eastern coast of Africa has been visible since 2010, with a considerable number of seizures carried out in both international and territorial waters and onshore. Seizures in the central section of the Indian Ocean have confirmed there are multiple maritime heroin trafficking routes. Interceptions confirm a range of landing points from those on the Swahili Coast that runs along the seaboard of much of Eastern Africa, to the central section of the Indian Ocean in the Maldives and Sri Lanka. (UNODC 2016:4)*

As the quote documents, the route is made visible through a number of reference points, which are mainly the location of 'seizures' at sea, as well as at 'landing points'. In addition, the concept of 'exit points' (from Afghanistan), as well as regular vessel 'transit routes' and 'metronomic data' is used throughout the report (UNODC 2016). Constructed in such a way, the route becomes a reference for states along this space whom are affected by the influx of opiates. The 2016 meeting, which led to an inter-governmental declaration for collaboration (UN 2017), lists 18

countries from Eastern and Southern Africa, the Arab Peninsula, Asia and Australia as members of the partnership.[v]

Similar to the cases of Codes discussed above, a new form of inter-governmental space is constructed through this agreement. Identifying the quality of law enforcement at sea as the main problem to respond to (McLaughlin 2016), the main activities within the Southern Route Partnership are capacity building projects, geared at improving prosecutions, information sharing, and skills such as boarding, inspection or evidence collection.

Maritime Domain Awareness and Areas of Interest

The concept of Maritime Domain Awareness refers to a set of practices through which security actors have started to monitor and surveil the sea. Data is collected and fused from different sources to develop what is called a "common operational picture" of marine activities. Part of the practices is also to assign threat levels to maritime behavior through patterns of life analysis and anomaly detection algorithms. As a form of knowledge production about security at sea, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) has become one of the core tools in maritime security responses (Boraz 2009; Doory 2016). The wish to know more about what happens at sea, and compile statistics and trend analysis is in many ways a core component of the maritime security agenda, and its success in presenting the oceans as a transnational security space. A global network of national and regional centers conducting MDA has emerged in the past decade, with centers in the Mediterranean and in Southeast Asia the most widely known.

The MDA agenda is driven by the availability of new sensors (Nyman 2019): Through the global space-based Automated Identification System (AIS) large vessels can be tracked in real time. Vessel monitoring systems are increasingly used to monitor smaller vessels, in particular fishing fleets. Such data is enhanced through availability of other data sources relevant for the maritime, for example, from customs and border agencies. MDA is also informed by ideas of intelligence led policing at sea. The analysis of incident data is used to identify patterns where and when an offense is likely to occur and what vessels are potential offenders (Mcgarrell and Freilich 2007). The associated hope is to move beyond reactive responses and develop strategies that allow to employ naval assets more efficiently in patrol and through targeted interceptions. Indeed, the operational analysis informing the IRTC discussed above is one example for such a form of intelligence-led operation. MDA has been widely promulgated through international capacity building activities, including the UNODC and IMO, but also security actors such as the US and the EU, both of which have developed their own technical systems for MDA: the SeaVision platform and the Indian Ocean Regional Information Sharing (IORIS) system.

The core spatial references for MDA is that of the Area of Interest (AoI) and the Common Operating Picture (COP). The AoI defines what data an MDA center collects and analyses. The majority of national MDA centers define their AoI as going well beyond the borders of their territorial waters and their EEZ. Australia's AoI, for instance, stretches far into the Indian Ocean (Brewster 2018). Likewise, regional centres establish a quite large area. For instance, the Information Fusion Center based in Singapore, that is the core MDA center for Southeast Asia, has an AoI that stretches from the Maldives in the West, to Australia in the East. To some degree

regional MDA centers have carved up ocean space through their AoIs. For instance, the MDA center for the Western Indian Ocean – the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Center – has designed its area so it directly borders the IFC to the East and the Mediterranean Center to the North (Jeulain 2019).

The AoI is used as the template for constructing the COP. The COP is an onscreen reality in which all incidents and historical and real time data on movements at sea are presented on an interactive digital map. As a technical officer from the US Coast Guard describes it,

> *at its core, the COP is a geographic display that contains position and amplifying information about contacts (called tracks). Tracks in the common operational picture are discovered by various sensor sources. The COP provides the network infrastructure to exchange, share, and manipulate the track data. (Hannah 2006: 66)*

As Hannah describes it, the COP is the visualization of all data available in the AoI. This onscreen reality also allows for users of the picture to interact and exchange data, to add data, but also to communicate through the platform:

> *Technically the COP is a display of relevant information shared by more than one command. It provides a shared display of friendly, enemy/suspect, and neutral tracks on a chart, with geographically referenced overlays and data enhancement. [It] contains a decision-maker toolset, fed by track and object databases. Each user can filter and contribute to these databases according to his or her area of responsibility or command role. [It] includes distributed data processing, data exchange, collaboration tools, and communication capabilities. (Hannah 2006: 65)*

Through MDA the oceans are not only carved up in AoIs, but become virtual zones of interaction of law enforcement professionals. The oceans are rendered into a plane on which objects are tracked, color coded and are allocated risk levels. Similar to the on-screen realities of financial markets (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 2002), the COP allows law professionals to interact and share maritime space in a collective experience and to agree on what is a danger requiring response and what not.

The technologically enhanced maritime space produced in MDA arguably dehumanise maritime space, so that it is no longer humans and people, but objects, which populate the space. Yet it becomes re-humanised as it provides for new interactions between professionals across agencies and borders.

Conclusion

The starting point for this chapter was the question if and how the rise of the maritime security agenda has led to new forms of spatialities. To address this question, I adopted the concept of pragmatic spaces. The concept integrates insights from other recent spatial metaphors, such as assemblages or technological zones. Pragmatic spaces are firstly deeply relational. They depend on relations between people, objects and technologies established in practices. They are secondly made in and through practices. Practices, I have identified, include calculating optimal response

times for naval vessels, developing guidelines for the self-protection of shipping vessels, information sharing and capacity building, operational coordination between navies, or attempts to know activities at sea by turning vessels into objects to be tracked. Pragmatic spaces are, thirdly, designed to respond to particular problems. The spaces I discussed are all responses to maritime security issues and attempts to repress and prevent incidents that threaten goods and populations. This included piracy attacks, but also the smuggling of narcotics and other forms of maritime crime. Pragmatic spaces are fourthly fragile in that they are weakly institutionalized. They tend not to rely on legally binding rules and norms, but are driven by informal guidelines, information sharing networks, partnerships or technical apparatuses. They are not only open to revision, such as the HRA and the Q map series, but also need to be enacted, as the examples of the two regional codes, the Southern Route Partnership or MDA centers highlight. Without doubt many more spatial constructs can be identified in tracking responses to maritime insecurity drawing on this conceptual framework.

Maritime security presents a profound shift in in terms of how the oceans are problematised and governed. Maritime Security is also, notably, productive of new spaces. These add to the complexity of how oceans today are ordered and governed through zones and other forms of spatialities. Only some illustrative cases could be investigated in this chapter. It is likely that studying the response to other maritime insecurities (such as illegal fishing) in other parts of the world than those focused upon here, will reveal further formations of new spatialities of governance. As the maritime security agenda gains in salience and is increasingly related to other spaces at sea – such as those established by the conservationist agenda (for example Marine Protected Areas and maritime peace parks), as well as extended to cover new issues, such as critical maritime infrastructures (such as the global submarine data cable and electricity network) – this complexity is only likely to increase.

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[i] Contrary to Glück (2015:644), I do not want to limit the concept of security space to "the production of secure spaces for the circulation of certain 'desirable' elements (in this case cargo vessels, commodities, and capital) and the suppression of other 'undesirable' elements (that is, piracy and the interruption of commodity and capital flows)". The concept of pragmatic spaces leaves it undecided what is secured, desirable and undesirable, and rather starts out from a description of the form of spatiality, relations and interactions security practices produce.

[ii] BMP3. Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and Arabian Sea Area, Edinburgh: Witherby Seamanship International, 2010, p.3

[iii] UK Hydgrographic Office. 2019. Security Related Information to Mariners, https://www.admiralty.co.uk/maritime-safety-information/security-related-information-to-mariners

[iv] The Combined Maritime Forces are a U.S. led naval partnership comprised of task forces working on counter-terrorism, counter-piracy and counter-narcotics missions. For an overview and discussion see Percy 2016.

[v] Bangladesh, Comoros, India, Maldives, Mozambique, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Australia, Iran, Mauritius, Qatar, Pakistan, Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Seychelles, South Africa and Thailand.

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Biography

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