



S A F E S E A S

Mastering Maritime Security:
Reflexive Capacity Building and the
Western Indian Ocean Experience

A Best Practice Toolkit





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Lead authors: Professor Christian Bueger and Professor Timothy Edmunds. Research associates: Dr Rupert Alcock and Dr Robert McCabe.



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Abbreviations

EUNAVFOR	European Naval Forces	OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation	SSR	Security Sector Reform
IMO	International Maritime Organisation	UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
MDA	Maritime Domain Awareness	WIO	Western Indian Ocean region
MSCB	Maritime Security Capacity Building		
MSSR	Maritime Security Sector Reform		

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Executive summary

Towards reflexive capacity building for maritime security

1. Tackling maritime security is one of the major global challenges today. Safeguarding international transport by sea; preventing accidents and disasters; fighting transnational organised crimes like piracy and the trafficking of narcotics and weapons; addressing fishery crimes and preventing other environmental crimes are all vital for international security, realising the prospects of the blue economy and protecting ocean health.
2. Maritime security is a global task. It requires effective maritime security governance at national and regional levels, and external capacity building to assist countries in developing their human, institutional and material capacities.
3. Mastering maritime security requires reflexive capacity building (Box 1). This report draws on the Western Indian Ocean experience to demonstrate what reflexivity means in practice and how it can lead to better, more efficient and more effective governance structures and reform projects (Box 2).
4. This report presents a toolkit for policy makers and practitioners involved in maritime security. It also provides an essential guide for the planning, programming and implementation of capacity building for maritime security.

Understanding the challenges of maritime security

5. Maritime security is characterised by its complex and cross-cutting nature. It incorporates a wide range of security concerns, including traditional themes of geopolitics and naval competition, challenges such as piracy, smuggling, illegal migration, trafficking and fishery crimes, the spillover of conflict and state fragility into the maritime domain and issues relating to environmental protection and so-called blue growth (Sections 2.1 and 5.3; Box 4).
6. Maritime security practitioners need to adopt a holistic view of maritime security and understand the interlinkages between problems and the unintended consequences of responses (Section 2.1; Box 5).
7. Context matters. Maritime security governance and capacity building pose a different order of challenge in a country with a history of maritime engagement, stable government and strong institutions, than in conflict-afflicted, fragmented, or weak state environments (Sections 2.2 and 5.3).
8. Lack of awareness of the importance of the sea means that it can be an uphill struggle to gain political attention or resources for revising maritime security policies and building capacity (Section 2.3; Box 6).



Challenges of building capacity for maritime security

9. Capacity building is best steered and coordinated by receiving countries. External practitioners need to engage domestic actors substantively in programme formulation, planning, implementation and evaluation (Section 3.1).
10. Local ownership in capacity building is a key principle. The responsibilities ownership implies need to be negotiated in on-going processes of collaboration between domestic and international actors (Section 3.1; Box 7).
11. Maritime capacity building raises issues of ambition, sequencing and coordination. Encompassing and holistic conceptions of capacity building work best at the level of strategic planning. They can function as an organising framework against which to develop specific, technically discreet activities aimed at specific components of the maritime security sector (Section 3.2).
12. Multiple actors and projects are involved in most cases of capacity building. Working relations and information sharing between all actors involved are required. Transparency about activities is the pre-condition for coordination. Some amount of duplication and competition is likely to be inevitable (Section 3.3; Box 8).



Best practices for organising maritime security governance

13. Problems come first. Dedicated capacities for understanding problems and maritime security policy analysis are required (Section 4.1; Box 9).
14. Maritime security strategies and plans are an important governance tool. Strategies need to provide overall direction as well as describe governance structures and the roles and responsibilities of each agency. It is vital that these are drafted through broad consultative processes and should include a review and accountability mechanism (Section 4.2; Box 10).
15. The reflexive practitioner embraces complexity and recognises that tensions originating in diverging interests, cultures or professional perspectives cannot be coordinated away. Instead of hiding tensions, coordination work benefits from making them explicit (Section 4.3).

Maritime Domain Awareness

16. Effective knowledge production about activities at sea, also known as Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), is one of the backbones of successful maritime security governance. MDA involves monitoring activities at sea, fusing information provided by different agencies and analysing this data to identify patterns, trends, anomalies and suspicious activities (Section 4.5; Boxes 11 and 12).
17. MDA is often understood as a high-tech challenge of installing and integrating sensors, developing databases and algorithms, or visualising data. The human dimensions and analytical capacities, however, are equally vital. Vital data can be collected from human sources, particularly social media and the broader maritime security community (Section 4.5; Boxes 11 and 12).

Executive summary

Governing the national maritime security sector

18. Effective maritime security policies look beyond the state with the aim of integrating all users of the sea, including the shipping, fishing and tourism industries, coastal communities, artisanal fishermen and recreational users, such as surfing and sailing communities (Section 4.8).
19. Institutional arrangements for maritime security should be problem- and circumstance-driven, rather than by often notional issues of institutional labelling or expectation. Overall structures, threat assessments, existing capacities, professional cultures and available resources should influence decisions (Section 4.6; Box 13).
20. Efficient solutions for organising the operational work of agencies active in the maritime domain are required to achieve synergies and pool limited resources and capabilities. In general, there are two models of organisation: identifying a lead agency or creating a multi-agency task force (Section 4.7).
21. Maritime security, the blue economy and ocean health depend on each other. Resource constraints demand that these sectors are closely coordinated to avoid the duplication of efforts (Section 4.9; Box 14).

Negotiating external assistance

22. Governments that rely on support from donors and international organisations must carefully manage external assistance to ensure that it serves the country's needs. They need to steer and coordinate donor projects, as well as negotiate and monitor implementation (Section 4.11).
23. All donors have agendas and interests. These can be managed by ensuring that receiving countries take the lead and seek transparency regarding the donor's intentions. Small states have enjoyed success when coping with multiple donors without becoming dependent, by adopting a pragmatic and responsive approach (Section 4.12).

24. Capacity building projects have hidden costs for receiving countries. Human resources are required to administer capacity building projects and organise relations with donors. Staff attending training courses are not available for other duties. These hidden costs need to be evaluated and factored into the decision of whether to accept a capacity building offer and on what terms (Section 4.13).
25. Appropriate points of contact for donors and implementers from regional organisations are required. Identifying the right point of contact for maritime security is not always easy and often requires technical and operational maritime security knowledge, as well as diplomatic skills and international experience (Section 4.14).

Best practices for assisting countries in maritime security capacity building


26. The experience of capacity builders outside the maritime arena is a major source of knowledge, guidelines and lessons learned that can inform maritime capacity building efforts (Section 5.1; Box 15).
27. Coordination will be difficult if actors' activities remain hidden from each other. Shared repositories of information on capacity building activities, ideally both on-going and planned, can facilitate a common knowledge base amongst both providers and recipients and help to avoid the worst risks of duplication (Sections 5.2 and 5.6; Box 16).
28. Close liaison between planners in capitals and headquarters and implementers of projects on the ground should be encouraged. The emergent challenges and opportunities of capacity building are not always visible from the top of an organisation. Allowing for adaptation in the field and giving staff working on the ground the flexibility to de-conflict and set project priorities enable the pragmatic work-arounds needed. (Section 5.5; Box 17).

29. Experience and consistency matter if knowledge is to be consolidated and relationships with partners sustained. Practices that preserve institutional memory should be prioritised, particularly regarding issues of staff rotation and handover. Capacity building should be understood as a dynamic and ongoing endeavour, rather than a one-off intervention with rigidly pre-defined outcomes and goals (Sections 5.4 and 5.7; Box 18).

30. Capacity builders should be honest and transparent about what has failed. Recognising failure and taking lessons learned seriously can facilitate corrective action for future activities. Lesson learning is most effective if consolidated through mechanisms for preserving institutional memory and continuity of effort (Section 5.5).

31. Capacity building can be delivered through many different methods and it is important to recognise the strengths and weaknesses of each. Programming capacity building requires identifying the optimal mix of methods (Section 5.8; Box 19).

BOX 1: THE REFLEXIVE CAPACITY BUILDER



1. Why maritime security matters

“The vaguer the problem to be solved, the more resolute must we be in seeking points of departure from which we can begin to lay a course, keeping always an eye open for the accidents that will beset us, and being always alive to their deflecting influences.”

*Julian Corbett*¹

When the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was adopted it gave significant new rights to states, but it also established duties for the safety of activities at sea, the fight against crimes at sea and the protection of the maritime environment. It quickly became clear that many states lacked the capacity to execute their rights, perform their duties and contribute to the protection of the global commons. Building such capacity has been an ongoing challenge ever since.

Over the years, UNCLOS has been complemented by international agreements addressing issues such as transnational organised crime, transnational terrorism, port security and fishery crime, amongst others. These legal tools have further increased the need for building capacity. Moreover, there is a new and growing awareness of the general importance of the oceans for the global economy and economic development.

More than 90% of trade takes place by sea, with over 10,000 million tons of cargo transported via the world's oceans every year. Maritime resources are vital for developing national economies. What has become known as the 'blue economy' holds significant potential for tackling poverty and creating sustainable wealth. The UN Sustainable Development Goal 14 reiterates such a view, calling for marine resources to be better utilised in a sustainable manner and for greater protection of the oceans and seas.² Yet, it is not only an awareness of the (economic) opportunities of the sea that has grown. During the past decade, the vulnerabilities and risks of the maritime domain have also become increasingly recognised.

The oceans and seas are zones of insecurity. Development, trade and human security can be significantly threatened by violence at sea, piracy and other forms of maritime crime. Public awareness of the dangers at sea was particularly affected by the escalation of piracy off the coast of Somalia from 2008. The trade routes and maritime activities in the Western Indian Ocean were under

threat. A massive international response was required to reduce the number of incidents.³ Navies from across the world contributed to this response, since few countries in the region were able to address it themselves.

Indeed, it was this wave of piracy that made visible the vulnerabilities of many of the states in the region to maritime security threats, and their lack of capacity to deal with them. Regional countries woke up to the challenge and initiated capacity building projects and maritime security sector reform processes. International donors made significant investments in developing the capacities of states and establishing regional cooperation mechanisms.

The costs of piracy to the Western Indian Ocean region were considerable and included increased trade costs, as well as losses of income from tourism and fisheries.⁴ However, the piracy challenge also helped to focus attention on wider issues of maritime security. Illegal fishing endangers fish stocks and marginalises coastal populations. The trafficking of weapons and narcotics imperils public security and the stability of countries. The smuggling of illicit goods undermines the tax monopoly of the state and puts public health at risk. The spillover of the conflict in Yemen to the maritime domain has led to a new wave of violence against shipping.

Evidence points to the inter-relationship of these maritime threats,⁵ and a vicious circle linking under-development with maritime insecurity that must be broken. Maritime security and the blue economy are two sides of the same coin.⁶ Without maritime security and law enforcement at sea, ocean resources cannot be sustainably harvested and the marine environment cannot be protected. Without the prospects of the blue economy, coastal communities lack incentives to refrain from supporting illicit activities. An insecure maritime environment breeds further maritime violence and crime.



While these challenges are significant and persistent, maritime security capacity building in the Western Indian Ocean is also a success story from which to learn more general lessons.⁷ This report recasts the experiences of the region, and identifies best practices for the advancement of national and regional maritime security governance and collaborations between international donors, regional governments and non-state actors. It outlines core lessons, best practices and guidelines for maritime security sector reform and capacity building.

As the report argues, **mastering maritime security requires reflexivity**. In order to succeed, **reflexive maritime security practitioners must challenge their own assumptions and embrace the tensions and complexity of maritime security as a cross-jurisdictional, multi-agency task**. Reflexive capacity building implies **learning from experiences of failure and success and transferring lessons** between states and regions. It requires approaching capacity building as an ongoing activity in which lessons can be learned and methods of delivery improved, rather than as a one-off intervention with fixed start and end points.

Chapter two recasts the **wider challenges of maritime security**. 'Maritime security' is an encompassing concept that spans different domains and incorporates concerns regarding national security, marine safety, environment and blue health, as well as human security and blue justice. This conception implies that there is no universal understanding of maritime security, and that priorities differ across states and regions given the different challenges they face.

Chapter three reviews core **challenges of building capacities** for maritime security. 'Maritime security sector reform' and 'capacity building' are those activities through which countries address maritime security challenges. They imply the development of governance structures and institutions, human resources and material capabilities for law

enforcement at sea, while ensuring compliance with international norms and standards. The report argues that maritime security sector reform and capacity building activities should be defined by context. Best practices cannot provide a blue print; they require adjustment to specific situations.

Chapter four examines the **experiences of countries in the Western Indian Ocean region of reforming their maritime security structures**. The chapter discusses successful cases and identifies **best practices for governments**, including tools such as maritime security strategies and coordination committees, how to organise Maritime Domain Awareness and information sharing, how to address the problem of seablindness, as well as how to maximise benefits from international donor support.

Chapter five addresses **capacity building from a donor perspective and identifies key guidelines for programming, coordination and implementation**. It focuses in particular on how to manage the challenges of complexity, scope, problem definition, ownership and timescales.

Together, these best practices and guidance tools provide a repertoire for reflexive capacity building. Their implementation will promote the mastery of maritime security and the design of reforms that are sustainable, efficient and responsive to changing environments on land and at sea. The report is complemented by an annex that includes an annotated list of other guidance documents relevant for maritime security.

1. Why maritime security matters

BOX 2: LEARNING FROM THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN EXPERIENCE

This report draws on the Western Indian Ocean experience to demonstrate how maritime security challenges can be addressed by the reflexive practitioner. The region is an area of major global geostrategic significance and can be seen as a microcosm of the globalized maritime space as a whole. Primary maritime trade routes traverse the region from East and South Asia to Europe and beyond, as do the maritime export routes for Middle Eastern oil. Significant proportions of global maritime trade navigate through the area, including a large share of the world's crude oil supplies.

During the Cold War, the Western Indian Ocean was a significant area of operations for the navies of both super powers, which brought an increase in naval bases and military presence in the region. Actors with interests in the region therefore include not only its littoral states, but also a range of global stakeholders including the EU and NATO, the US, China, Russia and a plethora of multinational and commercial actors.

The Western Indian Ocean is home to a diverse range of security challenges. While it lacks the potency of geostrategic competition that can be found in regions like the South China Sea, it remains a space of major geopolitical and naval interaction between states. In addition, it has seen the most virulent outbreak of piracy in the modern period; it borders hotspots of terrorist activity and violence in Somalia and Yemen; it incorporates key trafficking routes for narcotics, humans and arms and has played host to significant fishery crimes and other environmental crimes. These insecurities are closely linked to instabilities and state fragility on land, highlighting not only the liminal nature of the challenges, but also their relationship to wider issues of development and insecurity.

Yet, the Western Indian Ocean has also been a crucible of innovation in the maritime arena. The region has seen experimentation in relation to counter-terrorism and sanctions enforcement, to piracy and criminality at sea, and to capacity building and development activities. Examples of innovative approaches to maritime security and capacity building in the region include the multinational naval partnership of the Combined Maritime Forces, the unique counter-piracy cooperation and capacity building coordination conducted by the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, as well as work conducted through the Djibouti Code of Conduct process, the EU-funded Regional Programme to Enhance Maritime Security (MASE) and the UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme, whose work began in the region.



BOX 3: MAP OF THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN



2. Challenges of maritime security

The maritime security environment presents significant challenges to practitioners. These derive either from the particular attributes of the maritime arena or from specific political contexts, or are more generally characteristic of capacity building. The challenges are rarely static. They change according to political and security developments at sea and on land, in international and domestic arenas, and in response to capacity building activities themselves. To navigate these challenges effectively, maritime security practitioners must be reflexive practitioners. They should remain alert to the dynamic nature of the maritime security environment and be prepared to change and adapt to opportunities as they arise, as well as to new challenges as they emerge.



BOX 4: PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA

The problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia between 2005 and 2012 is a good example of the complexity of maritime security. The collapse of the Somali state in the 1990s left coastal regions open to fishery crimes. Such activities exacerbated the already significant degradation of legitimate artisanal fishing economies caused by civil conflict, creating a substantial body of socially and economically dislocated young men whose primary 'saleable' skills were seamanship or military in nature. Piracy activities were tolerated and supported by coastal communities due to a strong defensive or moral narrative that portrayed it as a legitimate response to international predation.

As a maritime security problematic, therefore, piracy off the coast of Somalia broaches themes of national security (international naval patrols and engagements), maritime safety (safety and duty of care to hijacked ships' crews), economic development (fisheries protection and development) and human security (amongst vulnerable coastal communities). It is emblematic of the way in which many maritime security issues engender elements of both hard and soft power, in relation to both managing the consequences of insecurity and aspiring to address its root causes.⁸

2.1 Complexity and the cross-cutting nature of maritime security

Maritime security is characterised by its complex and cross-cutting nature. It incorporates a plethora of security concerns, including traditional themes of geopolitics and naval competition; transnational challenges such as piracy, smuggling, illegal migration, trafficking and fishery crimes; insecurity, conflict and state fragility in coastal regions and issues relating to environmental protection and so-called blue growth. These challenges often interact and influence each other, as the example of Somali piracy shows in Box 4.

A wide variety of different institutions and organisations are active in maritime security. These include long-established agents of maritime security such as navies and coastguards, but also a wider range of public and private actors including port authorities, the judicial and penal system, the shipping industry and artisanal fishing communities (see 4.8). The complexity of maritime security also stems from its often transnational nature, in that security challenges take place across and outside the territorial boundaries of individual states.

Such complexity implies that narrow or isolated responses to maritime security, which for instance address only one form of maritime crime, are unlikely to succeed and may even prove counter-productive. Maritime security practitioners need to adopt a holistic view of maritime security and understand how problems interlink.⁹

2.2 Maritime security issues differ across countries

Maritime security has a number of different dimensions and potentially includes a wide range of issues (see Box 5). Some maritime problems transcend state boundaries and are hence internationally shared, as shown by the example of piracy. Other issues, such as port security, are very similar in every country. Even so, the country contexts in which maritime security is situated can vary wildly in nature.

The definition of maritime security and the priorities assigned to distinct issues vary significantly between states and regions.¹⁰ Western and other international actors may prioritise threats to global commerce such as piracy or maritime proliferation of weapons, for example, while larger state powers might foreground geostrategic and deterrence concerns.¹¹ Poorer countries often emphasise challenges and opportunities relating to the blue growth agenda, such as the protection of artisanal fisheries, the safety of installations at sea, or safeguarding coastal populations from pollution.¹²

These differences are also apparent in relation to issues of state capacity and economic development. Maritime security governance and capacity building pose a different order of challenge in a country with a history of maritime engagement, stable government and strong institutions, than in conflict-afflicted, fragmented, or weak state environments.

These differences militate against universalised and one-size-fits-all approaches to maritime capacity building and call for detailed, context-specific prioritisations and needs assessments tailored to a state or region.

2.3 Lack of visibility and awareness

Historically, maritime security has been a relatively minor concern in many countries (for an example, see Box 6). In some cases, countries lack a strong maritime tradition or seagoing history; in others, security or economic development concerns have traditionally derived from the land. Elsewhere, this is because the international maritime order has been relatively untroubled for much of the past few decades, and has therefore demanded little in the way of political attention.¹⁴ Public awareness of maritime issues may also be limited, particularly outside specific locations such as port cities or fishing communities. In these ways, the importance of the sea has become hidden.

This tendency towards seablindness is changing, both because of the rise of various ‘new’ security challenges at sea, as well as the increasing importance attached to the blue economy agenda, particularly in the Global South.¹⁵ Even so, maritime issues can often be accorded lower political priority than other policy areas, and existing institutional and human resources are often more limited in the maritime sector than elsewhere. These **legacies of seablindness mean that it can be an uphill struggle to gain political attention or resources for revising maritime security policies and building capacity.**

BOX 5: MARITIME SECURITY MATRIX ¹³

MARINE ENVIRONMENT		ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT	
MARINE SAFETY		BLUE ECONOMY	
Accidents	Pollution	Smuggling	
Climate Change	MARITIME SECURITY	Piracy	
Terrorist Acts		IUU Fishing	
Arms Proliferation	Interstate Disputes	Human Trafficking	
SEAPOWERS		RESILIENCE	
NATIONAL SECURITY		HUMAN SECURITY	

2. Challenges of maritime security

BOX 6: KENYA – A SEABLIND MARITIME NATION?

Kenya is a coastal state mainly focused on land-based issues. Security challenges such as extremist violence, spillover from the situation in Somalia, disputes over land-ownership, or internal ethnic divisions dominate the security agenda. This focus has resulted in a neglect of the importance of the ocean, both as a source of insecurity but also of economic opportunity.

Kenya has a sizeable coastline and substantial Exclusive Economic Zones. It operates major ports for the entire Eastern African region and coastal tourism contributes significantly to the national economy. Kenya has one of the oldest and largest navies in the region and is also a regional power. Between 2008 and 2012 Somali piracy had a significant impact on the Kenyan economy, with an annual loss estimated by the World Bank of US \$58.9 million.¹⁶

Despite the effects of piracy and the promise of maritime resource exploitation, maritime security and the blue economy have only recently and incrementally become political priorities, following an initiative instigated by the president. This new prioritisation is reflected in the 2014 Security Laws (Amendment Act) that established a Border Control and Operations Co-ordination Committee; the passage of a Coastguard Bill in 2017; work on developing a national maritime security strategy and the establishment of the Blue Economy Implementation Committee in January 2017.



3. The scope of maritime security capacity building

Maritime security capacity building can be defined as “activities which are directed at the empowerment of governments and coastal communities to efficiently and efficaciously govern and sustainably exploit the maritime domain, including territorial waters and exclusive economic zones”.¹⁷

Capacity building hence implies a dauntingly holistic agenda of change and reform in institutions, governance, procedures and management across a wide range of different policy sectors. Holistic understandings are required to deal with the complexities of maritime security. They help guard against the danger of pursuing discreet and uncoordinated initiatives in specific sectors – such as coastguard reform – while leaving the wider institutional context on which such organisations are dependent unchanged.

However, the very breadth of the agenda means that it can be unwieldy, unrealistic and difficult to implement. Holistic conceptions of capacity building work best at the level of strategic planning. They function as an organising framework against which to develop specific, technically discreet activities aimed at specific components of the maritime security sector.

Maritime security governance requires ambition and vision, but also a pragmatic attitude strongly grounded in everyday needs and practical problems.



3.1 Organising capacity building collaboration through ‘ownership’

Many countries require international assistance to develop the capacities of their maritime security sector. To ensure the sustainability of capacity building and avoid long-term dependency on outside assistance, the cultivation of ‘local ownership’ is commonly agreed to be a leading principle of collaboration in the maritime arena and elsewhere.¹⁸ Ownership in this sense means the extent to which the process of capacity building is internalised by the institutions and political communities in which it takes place. **Ownership ensures that capacity building is effective and sensitive to context, and maximises the chance that reform will be sustained** once specific externally funded capacity building projects end.

The extent to which ownership is taken seriously by international actors varies significantly. Often, it is applied in a rhetorical or even impositional manner. In other cases, it implies the substantive engagement of local stakeholders in the planning, implementation and evaluation of projects.

Capacity building should be steered and coordinated by receiving countries (see Box 7). External practitioners should strive to engage domestic actors substantively in programme formulation, planning, implementation and evaluation. Ownership in capacity building is not a zero-sum game. It relies on a dynamic and on-going process of collaboration between domestic and international actors seeking to achieve realistic and context-relevant outcomes.

3. The scope of maritime security capacity building

BOX 7: SUCCESSFUL OWNERSHIP – THE CASE OF SEYCHELLES

Seychelles can be considered one of the most successful cases where maritime security sector reform projects have been steered and coordinated by the receiver country. To coordinate donors and capacity building in the country, the government installed a coordination committee at the ministerial level, assisted by a working group of agency representatives.

Seychelles conducted its own needs assessment and developed a comprehensive plan for investment and capacity building (see Box 10). The plan provided the basis for donor negotiations and ensured that all capacity building projects contributed to a long-term strategy. Part of the country's success was due to the hospitable environment it provided for external donors and its avoidance of lengthy bureaucratic processes. Explicit transparency and openness concerning the work conducted in the country ensured easy access to agencies, with projects regularly discussed in national newspapers.



3.2 Capacity building is a political activity

Maritime capacity building is often presented as a technical activity. Yet, it is explicitly political (see 4.12). External assistance is always an intervention into a political context. The provision of assistance is likely to create winners and losers in any given situation, for example by strengthening one institution to the detriment of another. Projects often draw on good governance, human rights and democratic principles, or emphasise transparency and accountability in policy making.

The political dimension can also be less obvious, for instance when work with formal governmental bodies is prioritised, while country-specific ways of handling things, which often draw on informal, personalized and pragmatic approaches to policy making and implementation, are not recognised.

Prescriptions of the international capacity building agenda face the danger that they become irrelevant to local circumstances, counterproductive, or undermined if they do not pay attention to existing formal and informal governance mechanisms and power relations (see 5.3). There is also the risk that important indigenous knowledge and practical experiences can be sidelined in favour of external and often generic, technical expertise.

Capacity building needs to combine technical expertise, practical local knowledge and an understanding of the political situation.

3.3 Coping with multiple actors

A multitude of actors are engaged in maritime security and capacity building. These include international or regional organisations such as the UN, EU and their constituent agencies, as well as individual states and departments within states, which may have their own capacity building programmes. Maritime security also engages a wide range of non-state actors, including international NGOs and foundations, and commercial shipping and fishing bodies.

These actors can sometimes be in competition or tension with each other. Tensions may develop between international actors regarding their differing political goals, strategic interests or favoured country partners, as well as between different departments that may be competing for resources or attention. Tensions may also occur

between capacity builders on the ground with differing professional standards or understandings of the problem at hand, between operational components of a mission and its headquarters, or between funded organisations of various types – whether private consultancies or NGOs – that may have to compete with each other for donor funding.

Recognising how many actors are involved in maritime security in a country and region and what kinds of projects they run is an **important step towards developing relations and information sharing** between all actors involved. **Transparency regarding activities is a pre-condition for coordination** (see 5.6 and Box 8). **Some duplication and competition is likely to be inevitable.**

3.4 Timescales and sustainability

Capacity building is a long-term endeavour. Capacity builders often aspire to achieve substantive reforms in governance and organisational culture. Under all circumstances, such changes take time and require the cultivation of relationships with relevant stakeholders and the development of local knowledge. It is important to approach maritime capacity building as an on-going, iterative process – one that takes place in dialogue with evolving local circumstances, priorities and practices – rather than as a one-off intervention with rigidly pre-defined outcomes and goals defined in a strategic master plan (see 4.10). The temptations of the latter approach are clear, particularly for international donors whose activities are often project-driven, time-limited, and take place against specific criteria for success.

Capacity building success should be defined by long-term contributions, not the narrow evaluation criteria of a discrete project. Projects are often evaluated positively, despite the reforms they introduce subsequently foundering due to their over-dependence on externally-sponsored programmes, or due to their isolation from the evolving security challenges and governance patterns of which they are a part.

Experience and consistency matter if knowledge is to be consolidated and relationships with partners sustained. Practices that preserve institutional memory should be prioritised.

BOX 8: CO-ORDINATION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST PIRACY

In the campaign against piracy off the coast of Somalia, several new coordination mechanisms have been developed and tested. Based on establishing shared problem understandings and strategies, informal relations and effective information sharing, these mechanisms have played a key role in containing piracy since 2012. Three have been the most significant:

1. The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) provided the overarching mechanism. Representatives from dozens of states and implementing agencies, including navies and capacity builders, met on a regular basis in its various forums. Its informal membership structure precluded political tensions from dominating its agenda, while allowing for non-state actors and industry representatives to participate. Its flexible organisational design enabled a division of labour into a few key areas, with responsibility for each assigned to a different independent working group. Its informal character allowed a community spirit of creativity and innovation to thrive.
2. A navy-to-navy initiative known as the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) Mechanism provided the coordination forum for military actors, many of which did not have a tradition of working together. The mechanism allowed for the pooling of capabilities and greater efficiency in deployments.
3. The European Union-led Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) coordinated activities by sharing information between all maritime actors, including industry bodies and commercial actors. It also installed an online information network that allowed for real-time coordination between actors via chat functionality.




4. Organising maritime security governance efficiently

In order to cope with the complexity of maritime security, governance structures must foster close coordination between all agencies of a country, regional partners and international donors (see Box 9). There are many different models of how coordination can be achieved. Over the years, even resource-rich countries have struggled to organise their maritime security structures in compliance with international obligations. Maritime security policy development and reform processes require an experimental approach. They are long-term projects and require incremental transformation and responsiveness to changes in the environment and donor policies. There are a number of evidence-based considerations, best practices and guidelines for the development of useful and effective tools.



BOX 9: MARITIME SECURITY GOVERNANCE



4.1 Problems come first

Maritime security policymaking requires a solid, evidence-based understanding of the issues and problems that need to be addressed. There are three kinds of issues that require different forms of assessment.

- 1. International obligations and standards.** These follow from the international conventions and treaties a country has ratified and is a member of. This requires an evaluation of which norms a government is expected to comply with, which norms and standards are already followed, as well as an assessment of which further conventions a government may join.
- 2. Known and established threats in the maritime domain.** Threats such as piracy, maritime violence, or maritime crimes such as smuggling, fishery and other environmental crimes affect countries differently (see 2.2). Incident statistics compiled by national authorities and international organisations such as the IMO, FAO and UNODC are an important source for developing a precise understanding of which threats are relevant to national maritime security.
- 3. Prospective risks and vulnerabilities.** These may arise from transformations in the external environment and future national plans, in particular marine resource exploitation and maritime conservation plans. Installations at sea such as oil platforms, for example, require protection, inspection and regulation. Marine protected areas require that environmental laws can actually be enforced.

Dedicated analytical capacities are vital sources for the reflexive practitioner in maritime security policy making (see 4.5). Analysis can be provided through in-house expertise, such as those of military or maritime departments, or sourced externally from universities, think-tanks and international organisations.

4.2 How to use maritime security strategies and plans

For many countries, maritime security strategies and plans are useful coordination devices. Such strategies provide overall direction and guidelines; they map agencies and accountability relations and describe maritime security governance structures and the roles and responsibilities of each agency. Often, as in the case of the EU Maritime Security Strategy or the Seychelles Maritime Plan (see Box 10), they are accompanied by detailed plans of action and investment strategies.

A three-step process is required to draft a successful maritime security strategy:

1. An analytical assessment of the problems a country faces, the rules and regulations it has in place and the assets it has available to deal with these.
2. A consultation process to identify needs and working procedures between all governmental agencies involved with the maritime, as well as private users of the sea.
3. Giving the strategy legitimacy through parliamentary ratification and public dissemination.

There are three known fallacies when drafting such documents:

- If consultation is not broad and deep enough, maritime agencies might not buy into the strategy and may sideline it with other initiatives.
- If the strategy does not include concrete measures for a regular review process and an accountability mechanism, it will have a short shelf-life and will soon become outdated.
- Strategies need to be concrete and problem-centred. If they are too ambitious, generic or abstract and not followed by immediate implementation initiatives, they risk becoming merely symbolic documents that fail to trigger action.

4. Organising maritime security governance efficiently

BOX 10: NATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGIES

National maritime strategies are a relatively new tool for organising maritime security. Since the US launched its maritime strategy in 2005, several states and regional organisations have drafted their own strategies and national plans. Maritime security strategies have several dimensions, relating to both the internal organisation of a state's maritime structures, as well the principles on which its external, international engagements are based.

The 'Seychelles Comprehensive Maritime Plan of Action (2010-2040)' is an example of a successful drafting process. The document was based on a broad intra-governmental consultation process that comprised a detailed analysis of the country's maritime security situation. It was authored by two governmental experts with different sets of competences. The document combines solid analysis and a consultation-based needs assessment with a detailed investment plan. As a result of the plan, maritime security became a political priority issue and agencies were provided with specific direction. The concreteness of the investment plan, which for example describes what kind of vessels and equipment the coastguard would require, allowed for the efficient organisation of relations with donors and external capacity builders. In consequence, Seychelles has successfully benefitted from capacity building and is today recognized as an exemplary case. The plan's main weakness was its lack of a mechanism for update and review. This led Seychelles to begin the process of drafting a new national maritime security strategy in 2017.

The maritime security strategy of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is an example of a less successful template, owing to certain flaws in the drafting process. Due to a lack of consultative processes, the strategy is pitched at an abstract level and appears detached from the contemporary political environment and the groundwork of capacity builders. The result is a vague and overly ambitious strategy. Its political status and the degree to which it directs political action remain unclear.



4.3 Interagency work needs coordination at political and technical levels

Maritime security requires on-going coordination at both political and technical levels. Several countries have successfully installed Political High-Level Committees, often at ministerial level, as well as Inter-Agency Committees or Taskforces. Maritime security, however defined, permeates the portfolios of different ministries and agencies including interior and justice, security and defence, environment, fishing and tourism. The primary function of such committees is to ensure transparency and the flow of information between agencies. They also serve as a forum where divergent interests and plans can be debated and ideally streamlined through governmental leadership.

The reflexive practitioner in such committees recognises that the divergent interests, institutional dynamics and professional perspectives that different actors have cannot be coordinated away. Instead of hiding such differences, committee work benefits from making them explicit.

4.4 Increasing public awareness of the importance of the sea

It is important to raise public awareness of the importance, risks and opportunities of the sea. Such awareness campaigns may include, for example, op-eds in national newspapers on features of maritime security, events held in conjunction with global maritime celebrations – the African Day of the Seas and Oceans (July 25th), the World Oceans Day (June 6th), or the IMO World Maritime Day (September) – or foregrounding the oceans as an item in educational programmes at different levels.

These activities can help to counter the seablindness that is often a core hindrance for maritime security policy making (see 2.3). Policy elites often fail to recognise their country's economic dependence on the sea, the high costs associated with maritime insecurity, or the prospects and opportunities promised by developing the blue economy.

4.5 Knowing the sea: how to develop Maritime Domain Awareness

Establishing a centre that integrates data on maritime activity and analyses it is a priority.

Such centres share information between agencies at both national and regional levels. In many countries, a national centre also integrates search and rescue functions, as well as the monitoring of fisheries.

Effective knowledge production about activities at sea, also known as Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), is one of the backbones of successful maritime security governance at both national and regional levels.

MDA involves monitoring activities at sea, fusing information provided by different agencies and analysing this data in order to identify patterns, trends, anomalies and suspicious activities.

This knowledge is not only important for policy formulation, but also to increase the efficacy of maritime operations, preventive patrols and inspections, and to improve responsiveness to maritime incidents. Quick reaction capabilities are vital in the marine environment, such as in search and rescue situations, to prevent environmental disasters, or to ensure the timely arrest of suspects of maritime crime.

MDA has also been identified as one of the means of creating a culture of cooperation between maritime security agencies. MDA can nurture trust and confidence between agencies that have divergent organisational interests and cultures, but also different habits of addressing issues. Trust is both an outcome of and precondition for successful MDA. To develop trust, MDA centres need to facilitate frequent everyday interactions between agencies and prove that their work makes a recognisable difference (see Box 11).

MDA is often primarily understood as a high-tech challenge of installing and integrating sensors such as radar stations, developing databases and anomaly-detection algorithms, or visualising data. Human dimensions and analytical capacities are equally vital, however. Data can be collected from human sources rather than sensors, whether these are informants from the broader maritime community such as fishermen, or public sources like social media or the news. High-tech systems are not only expensive, but tend to come with high

maintenance costs. Developing MDA capabilities therefore requires the right mix between high- and low-tech.

A model that has been successfully introduced in several countries is that of an MDA centre that fuses data from sensors and human sources through a central database and is staffed with seconded personnel from each maritime agency. Developing appropriate standard operating procedures is key to overcoming the known barriers to information sharing (see Box 12). MDA centres can also contribute to public awareness and cooperation between all users of the sea, for example through newsletters, frequent events that bring together the broader maritime security community, or coastal community engagement programmes (see 4.4 and Box 11).

BOX 11: CORE TASKS OF MDA CENTRES

DATA FUSION

Sensors
Human resources



Regional MDA



Policymakers

DATA ANALYSIS

Incident response
Trend analysis



MDA CENTRE



Operative Agencies

AWARENESS

Inter-agency reports
Policy briefings
Public dissemination



Criminal Justice Sector

ENGAGEMENT

Maritime security community
Public awareness campaigns
Education programmes



Public



Maritime Security Community

4. Organising maritime security governance efficiently

4.6 What serves a country better: coastguards or navies?

One of the core questions raised by maritime security is which agency takes the lead in law enforcement operations at sea. While there are different models of how responsibilities for seagoing law enforcement can be divided, a major debate concerns whether maritime security is better organised through navies or coastguards (see Box 13). Navies are organisations with military structures responsible to ministries of security and defence, while coastguards are civil law enforcement agencies often working under ministries of interior.

Some countries have both a navy and a coastguard.²⁰ This model comes with high financial and coordination costs, however, and risks duplication and organisational competition. Hence, many countries operate with only one agency that is often a hybrid between a navy and a coastguard. Labelling can often be confusingly notional. The Seychelles Coastguard, for example, is primarily a military organisation and part of the country's defence forces. In many respects, it is more of a navy than a coastguard.

Placing law enforcement at sea in the hands of a military organisation and the military culture that comes with it often has the advantage of drawing on well-organised bureaucratic and command structures. Navies have a long-standing tradition of engaging with other countries' navies and can be useful tools of diplomacy and cooperation. Yet, military organisations are often not the best suited to deal with shipping and fishing industries or recreational users. War-fighting skills, often central to navy education, are less useful for maritime security. Specialist skills and procedures for evidence collection, arrest and transfer are required. Many donors are also reluctant to fund capacity building projects for navies since they can be used as tools for inter-state aggression.

Ultimately, the choice of which model to pursue should be determined by issues such as core role, threat assessment, existing capacities (including for training), professional culture and available resources.

4.7 Implementing through lead agencies or joint task forces?

A major question facing maritime security policy makers is how to organise the operational work of agencies active in the maritime domain. This is important to avoid duplication and ensure the effective use of limited resources and capabilities. There are different models of how to organise inter-agency relations. The Maritime Security Sector Reform guide of the U.S. Government for instance, suggests a list of functions that a maritime security sector needs to perform and recommends placing a dedicated agency in charge of each.²¹ An alternative approach is to identify problems and ask which agency or combination of agencies can address them most effectively.

BOX 12: BARRIERS TO INFORMATION SHARING

There are a number of known barriers to information sharing that need to be overcome.¹⁹

Unintended use. Agencies might have concerns regarding data privacy, confidentiality and institutional exposure that lead to alternative performance evaluations or public scrutiny. Data might be protected under dedicated laws.

Data is often organisation bound. Information is influenced by mandates, values and traditions. Information might hence be cast within organisation-specific categories and structures or in bespoke metrics, which creates the risk of misinterpretation or data loss. In a security context data is also often classified, with high administrative burdens for declassification.

Resources. Agencies are often suspicious of initiatives that drain resources but have unproven outcomes, particularly if no additional external funding for sharing is available.

Organisational identity and autonomy. Information sharing has impacts on the availability of knowledge and hence the hierarchy between agencies. Agencies might understand information sharing as a threat to their autonomy. In an international context these challenges may be exacerbated by concerns over national sovereignty or international status.

Career incentives. Agencies might allocate personnel with insufficient skills or motivations to data sharing activities, since inter-agency collaboration is often not planned for or incentivised in organisational career paths.

Known solutions to these challenges include the joint development of standard operating procedures that explicitly address these concerns, community building exercises and shared training activities, and placing a strong emphasis on documenting and disseminating the benefits of information sharing.

In general, there are two models of organisation: either identify a lead agency, or create a multi-agency task force. The first approach has the advantage of demarcating clear lines of authority and accountability. The major disadvantage is that the agency might not possess the skills, material capacities or law enforcement powers required to perform the task. It might also lead to a situation of competition over resources between agencies. The main advantage of the second approach is its flexibility and the greater efficiency that pooling human and material resources promises. The potential risks of this approach, however, derive from blurred lines of accountability, as well as potential difficulties in resource allocation. Its success is also dependent on how well such task forces can circumvent mismatches between different organisational identities.

4.8 Looking beyond the state: working with the wider maritime security community

This broader maritime security community often holds important information and is vital in ensuring the fast transmission of reports on safety incidents and illicit activities. Working closely with such actors is also an important crime-prevention measure. Users of the sea are potential collaborators in or even perpetrators of maritime crimes.

Effective maritime security policies look beyond the state with the aim of integrating the maritime security community. The maritime security community consists of all users of the sea, including the shipping, fishing and tourism industries, coastal communities, artisanal fisherfolk, recreational users such as surfing and sailing communities, as well as environmental organisations (see 2.1).

Maintaining active channels of communication with all users of the sea and running coastal community engagement programmes are important for raising awareness for maritime security policies, but also as preventive measures and to ensure quick incident responses. MDA centres can be vital in organising relations with the broader maritime security community (see 4.5).

BOX 13: COASTGUARDS

The development and expansion of coastguards separate from navies has been a product of the introduction of UNCLOS, particularly in East Asian countries. There are many reasons why states might want to develop a separate coastguard. In many countries, constitutional and political factors prevent naval forces from enforcing maritime laws with wide powers of arrest, particularly over national citizens. Coastguards typically function as paramilitary arms of civilian institutions with diverse responsibilities relating to issues like regulation of commerce and maritime safety. An important coastguard function is therefore to keep the military removed from questions of domestic and international politics, drawing the same sharp distinction that most countries maintain onshore between military and civil police. Increased maritime regulation and the complexities of maritime law enforcement also require specialized training often not suitable for navies to continually undertake.

Coastguard functions vary according to a range of political, cultural and economic factors, often exceeding basic law enforcement to include lifesaving, shipping regulation, maritime management and environmental protection. Certain coastguard functions require cooperation between neighbouring countries, regarding for example search and rescue responsibilities or countering human trafficking. Such tasks require effective information sharing between neighbouring law enforcement agencies relating to operational and doctrinal practices that would be inappropriate between navies, given common military sensitivities. Coastguard units can also offer a more circumspect approach to maritime law enforcement than high profile military vessels, which risk escalating tensions between neighbouring countries when deployed in sensitive or disputed areas. As well as providing a less politically symbolic means of maritime law enforcement, coastguard patrol vessels and aircraft are often significantly cheaper to procure and maintain than naval assets.

In practice, there is an enormous variety of models adopted by countries to organise the various agencies involved in maritime management and security, with many adopting hybrid models. Hybrid models vary according to the degree to which the division of responsibility between the navy and civilian agencies is formalized. The United Kingdom is an example of a federated system, in which most maritime tasks are carried out by civilian agencies while the navy provides military assistance when required. Norway is an example of a more integrated system, wherein the coastguard forms part of the navy itself, within the Armed Forces. Hybrid models reflect a pragmatic approach to inter-agency organisation and are often designed on the basis of practical need and economic viability, as opposed to idealised institutional or doctrinal distinctions.²²

4. Organising maritime security governance efficiently

4.9 Integrating blue economy work: fishery and environmental protection

Maritime security, the blue economy and ocean health depend on each other (see Boxes 14 and 18). **Resource constraints demand that these sectors are closely coordinated and that efforts are not duplicated.** Fishery services and environmental agencies hold information generated from their monitoring activities that is relevant to maritime security. Regulation of offshore resource exploitation, monitoring of fisheries and environmental protection require law enforcement at sea. Successful maritime security policies require the integration of the blue economy and ocean health.

4.10 Working with different time scales

Maritime security reform is an incremental transformation process operating at different time scales (see 3.4). Some measures, such as the instalment of committees or the drafting of maritime security strategies, can be implemented in relatively short time frames. Nurturing a culture of collaboration between agencies, raising public awareness of the sea and developing the blue economy sector require a longer-term perspective. The education of maritime security professionals in operational skills as well as knowledge domains such as navigation, maritime law or ocean management also requires a long time horizon, particularly if educational institutions and programmes need to be established from scratch.

Strategies and plans should therefore combine short, medium and long-term goals.

4.11 Coordinating donor programming and delivery

Capacity building delivered by external actors needs to be carefully managed in order to serve the receiving country's specific needs. **Receiving governments need to steer and coordinate donor projects and negotiate the terms of implementation with the providers** (see Box 7). Dedicated resources for managing relations with donors are required, in the form of coordination committees or planning documents such as maritime security strategies (see 4.2 and Box 10). Countries' own needs assessments and investment plans provide the necessary direction and guidance, as well as an inventory of particular gaps. Such an approach provides the best basis for negotiating with donors and external partners.

Donors often work within a project frame and from their own understanding of what problems need to be addressed and prioritised, and how they should be fixed. Implementers often lack understanding of a country's political situation or the current state of its maritime security sector, due to their limited abilities to gather such knowledge. The project frame implies that capacity building offers are mostly short-term and focused on measurable deliverables to prove success and impact. Understanding the 'project logic' and the interests and working procedures of donors is therefore important.²³



4.12 Do donors have hidden agendas?

Since the world economy depends on trade by the sea and transnational organised crime is a global concern, all major economic powers have a basic interest in assisting states to build capacity to monitor their waters and Exclusive Economic Zones. Yet capacity building does not take place in an empty void. **Donors pursue interests and bring their own normative assumptions when they decide to invest in capacity building.**

Interests might stem from geopolitical and geostrategic thinking, like concerns regarding spheres of power and influence. This might produce competition over partner countries in a region. Capacity building might also be motivated by an intention to improve trade and economic relations, to create a favourable investment climate for a donor's companies, or linked to plans to sell dedicated maritime security equipment and maintenance contracts.

These interests influence capacity building investments. In the Western Indian Ocean, for example, there is political and economic competition between the US, China and India, all of whom have established naval bases as a way to project power and exert influence.

Donors also work within their own normative assumptions and prioritisations. These are not always compatible with the needs of a country. Some donors want to replicate the measures they use at home, demand compliance with certain norms such as parliamentary control and human rights standards, or prioritise one particular maritime security issue, such as piracy, which is high on the donor country's national foreign policy agenda.

The interests, preferences and normative assumptions of donors increase the risk of unintended consequences and mismatches between a proposed donor project and the receiving country's existing structures and plans (see 3.2).

BOX 14: FISHERY CRIMES AND THE LINK BETWEEN MARITIME SECURITY AND THE BLUE ECONOMY

Fishery crimes forcefully highlight the importance of integrating the blue economy and maritime security. Revenues from the fishing industry are an important component of the national economies of many coastal states, particularly Small Island Developing States. They are also vital for food security and for the livelihoods of coastal communities. Many fish stocks are over-harvested and endangered by degrading ocean health caused by climate change and pollution, such as that produced by plastic waste. Illicit, unlicensed fishing in violation of fishery regulations puts additional pressure on fish stocks.

There is a close relationship between fish and maritime insecurity. Firstly, evidence points to the relation between illegal fishing vessels and other crimes, in particular the smuggling of narcotics. Secondly, the decline of revenue from fisheries for coastal communities may lead individuals to seek alternative forms of income by supporting and harbouring maritime criminals, directly engaging in illicit activities or forms of maritime violence. Thirdly, as the case of piracy off the coast of Somalia demonstrates, observable illicit or unregulated fishing activities can provide a powerful motive and legitimisation for organised crime (see Box 4).

Fishery regulation and enforcement sit at the intersection of maritime security and the blue economy. Data from Vessel Monitoring Systems and information from fishermen are important intelligence sources in the fight against maritime insecurity more generally. Fishery regulations, moreover, require enforcement by coastguards and navies. The economic prospects of fisheries can also provide important incentives for prioritising maritime security and engaging in regional information sharing and shared law enforcement operations.



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Such problems can be addressed by ensuring that receiving countries take the lead and seek transparency regarding a donor's intentions and interests. Small states such as Seychelles have been successful in coping with multiple donors, without becoming donor-dependent (see Box 7). They have done so through detailed investment plans, by making the work of externals in the country transparent, and by pursuing a pragmatic and responsive approach.

4.13 The saturation problem: paying attention to hidden costs

Capacity building projects bring hidden costs for receiving countries. Human resources are required to administer capacity building projects and organise donor-relations. Staff attending training courses will not be available for other duties. **These hidden costs need to be evaluated and built into the decision of whether to accept a capacity building offer and on what terms.** Close coordination is required between governmental representatives who decide whether to accept an offer and the staff of agencies that will participate in or carry out the project. While it is particularly attractive for small states to accept all capacity building offers, the resources required need to be monitored. If and when a saturation point is reached, agencies might become overburdened and may underperform when carrying out their tasks and mandate.

4.14 Identifying the right points of contact

For donors and implementers of regional organisations, it is often difficult to reach out to countries. They struggle to identify the right individual or organisation to speak to or invite to a coordination meeting as a representative. The result can be that a government is weakly represented at international events, or that information about emerging opportunities is not adequately transmitted within the government.

Ensuring that all international partners are informed of the point of contact's name, contact details and organisation is an important way to mitigate this problem. Identifying the right point of contact for maritime security is not always easy, as technical and operational maritime security knowledge is required as well as diplomatic skills and international experience. Ideally, a point of contact has both types of experience and is able to directly transmit information and reports to national maritime security coordination bodies.

Some countries have had success when operating a system with two points of contact: one dedicated person in the ministry of foreign affairs, and one maritime security operative often working in a national MDA centre.





5. Planning and delivering maritime security capacity building externally

Significant investments have been made in maritime security capacity building in recent years. The reasons for its emergence are threefold:

1. As a response to the unsettling of established maritime orders and the rise of new security challenges at sea.
2. As a mechanism that aspires to address the 'root causes' of these challenges in the regions where they occur, and to support local security actors in doing so.
3. As a cost-effective alternative to direct security interventions by donor states themselves, and as an exit-strategy for existing deployments.

A series of important best practices for donors can be drawn from capacity building experiences to date. These considerations should be taken into account throughout planning, programming and implementation stages.



5.1 Learning from other domains of capacity building

Capacity building for maritime security is a relatively recent activity. In its present form, it emerged only in the wake of the rise of piracy off the coast of Somalia in the late-2000s. Capacity building has a longer history in other contexts, however, including in technical assistance programs provided by the International Maritime Organisation or in navy-to-navy cooperation, but also more generally in the development community and in relation to security sector reform activities on land.

Some characteristics of maritime security are particular to the marine environment, relating to issues of sovereignty, trans-nationality and the law of the sea. Other challenges are common to security capacity building endeavours more broadly defined:

- Challenges of scope and ambition: how wide or narrow should the aims of capacity building programmes be?
- Of coordination: how to avoid duplication and ensure a unity of effort between multiple different actors?
- Of participation: how to enable meaningful local ownership and participation for purposes of effectiveness, sustainability and legitimacy?
- Of time frames: how to implement change over time, particularly in the context of short project timescales?

The record of capacity builders outside the maritime arena is itself rather mixed. Such activities do provide an important source of experiences, lessons learned and guidelines, however, that can inform maritime capacity building efforts. We include an indicative list of sources in the Security Sector Reform section of Annex 2.

5.2 Shared problem definitions are required

Capacity building should be based on needs and focus on core gaps.

Developing a **shared understanding between donors and receivers of what the character of the problems are, what particular measures are required** to address them, and which of these are **not available from within existing resources**, are preconditions for successful coordination and delivery (see 4.1).

If a recipient country has not conducted its own needs assessment or has not developed a dedicated donor coordination process, donors

need to conduct their own assessment of problems, needs and priorities before programmes are planned.

Where possible, such assessments should be participatory and pay particular attention to the voices of all stakeholders, whether these come from other donors or from the recipient country. Rigidly fixed definitions of problems and needs can be quickly out-paced by events on the ground (see 3.4). Assessment should be seen as a dynamic and iterative process, and include mechanisms for periodic recalibration. Its outcomes should be in the public domain to enable knowledge sharing (see 3.3).

BOX 15: THE OECD/DAC GUIDELINES ON SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

The OECD/DAC guidelines on Security System Reform were published in 2007 and provide guidance for the operationalisation of SSR based on the 2005 DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance. There are seven key policy and operational good practices that emerge from the report:

1. Building understanding, dialogue and political will:

- Donors should engage in SSR with three overarching objectives: (i) improvement of basic security and justice service delivery; (ii) establishment of an effective governance, oversight and accountability system; (iii) development of local leadership and ownership of a reform process to review the capacity and technical needs of the security system.
- Technical inputs to SSR should be delivered and coordinated with a clear understanding of the political nature of SSR and institutional opportunities and constraints.
- The political terrain needs to be prepared in partner countries and early investments made in appropriate analysis.

2. Assessment

- Assessment tools should inform the design of realistic, focussed programmes.

3. Programme design

- Programmes need to be designed to help identify local drivers of reform and be flexible in supporting local ownership as it emerges.
- Donors must support partner countries to lead SSR processes.
- Donors must work with partners to ensure that initiatives to support the delivery of security and justice are conflict-sensitive and sustainable financially, institutionally and culturally.

- SSR programmes need to take a multi-layered or multi-stakeholder approach

4. Programme implementation

- The international community needs to move from ad-hoc, often short-term projects to more strategic engagement.
- Donors should strive to develop specific whole-of-government capacity to support SSR.
- SSR objectives need to focus on the ultimate outcomes of basic security and justice services.
- The international community should use appropriate instruments and approaches for different contexts.

5. Donor harmonisation and joint planning

- The international community needs to align support to the dominant incentive frameworks and drivers for change.
- SSR should be viewed as an integral part of the planning process for immediate post-conflict situations and peace support operations.

6. Choosing the right entry-point to broader system-wide reforms

- The Implementation Framework for SSR should be used to help place sub-sector reforms in the context of system-wide needs.

7. Impact and evaluation

- The key principles agreed in the 2005 DAC SSR Guidelines need to be translated into evaluation indicators.

5. Planning and delivering maritime security capacity building externally



BOX 16: ASSESSING NEEDS IN SOMALIA – THE KAMPALA PROCESS

Addressing Somalia's maritime resource and security needs required cooperation between its federal government and regional administrations, and the establishment of a single maritime focal point as mandated by the Djibouti Code of Conduct. Beginning in 2009 as a series of informal meetings convened by the UN Political Office for Somalia between representatives from the Transitional Federal Government, Somaliland, Puntland and other regions, the Kampala process is a good example of a participatory, bottom-up approach to coordination. By enabling effective information sharing and open discussion, these meetings established shared knowledge and problem definitions among international and Somali authorities in areas of legislative review, prisons, fisheries, and maritime safety and security.

By way of incremental steps and relationship building, the Kampala process culminated in the collective endorsement in 2013 of the Somali Maritime Resource and Security Strategy (SMRSS). The SMRSS remains the sole maritime strategy endorsed by all Somali administrations and provides a crucial road map for the country's developing maritime sector and the role of international partners within it.

The success of the Kampala process can be attributed to a number of factors:

- Its informal membership structure and flexible approach to coordination limited the discussion to technical maritime concerns and insulated the process from potential political tensions.
- Collective drafting of the SMRSS through dialogue and consultation ensured that the process reflected the diversity of interests at stake.
- Maintaining an inclusive forum focused solely on fostering cooperation meant that participants' specific maritime concerns and priorities remained adaptable to external developments.

5.3 Knowing the context and its politics

Recipient countries have different maritime traditions, political systems, levels of experience and existing capacities (see 3.2). Formal institutions may be well developed, if sometimes dysfunctional. Elsewhere they may be weak, paralleled or even effectively replaced by informal practices. Political systems rely on varying formal and informal governance processes, distributions of political power and bureaucratic and operational routines. In some cases, the authority and legitimacy of the government itself may be contested along regional, ethnic or political lines. Available resources and infrastructures to support reform – whether financial, human or material – can also vary radically between countries.

Capacity builders need to develop in-depth understandings of the political environments in which their programmes are situated (see Box 1). This knowledge is necessary to understand needs and constraints, and for identifying realistic pathways to impact.

The most important sources of local knowledge are domestic actors. The importance of building and maintaining trust with key interlocutors should not be underestimated. Capacity builders should not seek to sideline local knowledge regarding how things work in practice, in favour of abstract or idealised technical knowledge and expertise.

Experience and consistency matter if knowledge is to be consolidated and relationships with partners sustained. Practices that preserve institutional memory in these areas should be prioritised, particularly including issues of staff rotation and handover (see 3.4).

5.4 Circumstances can change rapidly

Capacity building takes place in a rapidly changing environment. Circumstances on the ground can evolve swiftly, as a consequence of changes in the political, organisational or security environment, or in response to the actions of capacity builders themselves.

In this context, the prescription of rigidly defined models of institutional or organisational reform or inflexible work plans can be problematic. Capacity building efforts are not well served by a top down, 'cookie cutter' approach that aims to impose externally derived models of reform.

Similarly, key challenges and congruencies of interest often only become apparent during the actual process of engagement. Capacity builders should be open to adaptation in relation to the problems they encounter, the relationships they build and the opportunities that are presented to them. There are often multiple different ways of reaching the same end.

5.5 Flexible programming and learning from failure

There can often be a **significant time lag between the planning and implementation phases of capacity building**, hence programmes frequently risk being outpaced by developments on the ground. Capacity builders can find themselves caught between the short-term demands of projects or donor interests and longer-term strategies of change (see 3.4).

There are no easy fixes to these tensions. However, they can be managed by building flexibility and adaptability into programme design. Channels for meaningful and responsive dialogue between capacity builders in the field and those in headquarters are required.

The emergent challenges and opportunities of capacity building are not always visible from the top of an organisation. The centre should be open to proposals from the field, and give autonomy to local staff to de-conflict and define the content of projects. Improvisation and flexibility at the operational level should be explicitly encouraged.

Tensions and redundancies in projects are most visible to those at the operational level who are engaged in implementation on a day-to-day basis.

Staff on the ground have the closest relationships with domestic actors and other implementing agencies, and are the most sensitive to political and organisational changes. Such nuances are not always visible or fully appreciated when viewed from a distance.

Capacity builders should also be honest and transparent about what has failed (see Box 17). Successfully constructing a coordination centre, for example, does not imply success if it is left empty and unused.

Recognising failure and taking lessons learned seriously can facilitate corrective action for future activities. **Lesson learning is most effective if consolidated through mechanisms for preserving institutional memory and continuity of effort.**

BOX 17: LEARNING AND ADAPTING IN EUCAP NESTOR/SOMALIA

EUCAP Nestor was a civilian mission launched by the EU in 2012 to support maritime security capacity building in five countries in the Western Indian Ocean region: Djibouti, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia and Tanzania. Its aim was to provide a long-term solution to the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia and provide an exit strategy for EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the EU naval mission in the region. The mission faced major challenges in its first few years. The mission's initial needs assessment process was perfunctory. Its mandate's degree of ambition was not matched by available resources, whether financial or human, and it struggled to achieve 'buy in' from partner states. Direction of Nestor's activities from the EU in Brussels was centralised and bureaucratic, with an emphasis on swift results linked to the mission's two-yearly mandate extension and budget cycle.

Following an Interim Strategic Review in 2015, a number of changes were made to the mission in response to these challenges. The mission was re-focussed on work in Somalia, renamed EUCAP Somalia in 2016, its headquarters moved from Djibouti to Mogadishu, and activities in Djibouti, Kenya and Seychelles were phased out. Its remit was also broadened, however, to include aspects of maritime security more in line with local priorities, such as IUU fishing, while its focus shifted from anti-piracy training to developing Somali maritime governance, institutions and operational capabilities. EUCAP Somalia remains an ambitious mission and continues to face challenges. However, the changes introduced since 2015 demonstrate a capacity for reflexivity in the face of failure and a capacity to reorganise and refocus activity in response to lessons learned.²⁴

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5.6 Transparency is key

If the activities of capacity builders stay hidden from each other, coordination will be difficult. **Shared repositories of information on needs assessment, capacity building activities** (ideally both on-going and planned), **evaluation reports and lessons learned** can facilitate a common knowledge base amongst both internationals and locals and **help to avoid the worst risks of duplication** (see 5.2).

Such repositories need to be accessible and responsive to the needs of users by presenting information in different formats (e.g. databases, narratives, annual reports). As far as possible the information should be in the public domain. The workload required to ensure that repositories remain updated needs to be factored into programming.

5.7 Capacity building requires 'zooming out'

Other domains of capacity building, for example in the economic, environmental or land security sectors, need to be kept in focus. The project-driven nature of capacity building means that practitioners can find it difficult to 'zoom out' and consider the wider environment and context in which their project or sub-project is situated (see 2.1).

The focus on single projects is understandable given the demands of strictly defined deliverables, benchmarks and evaluation criteria, and the fixed-term nature of funding allocations and employment contracts. Isolating a project from the broader context can also be important to actually make progress and deliver without being held up by coordination activities, the often-abstract character of the holistic approach, or the political dynamics of a recipient country and their relations to donors.

Even so, awareness of the wider context in which capacity building activities take place is important for coordination, and to prevent actions in one issue area having counterproductive effects in others. Zooming out should therefore imply a conscious effort to design programmes in ways that align with other projects and actors, and that recognise the tensions and potential unintended consequences that pertain between sectors (see Box 18).

A fully coordinated approach to capacity building is unrealistic and likely to fail. The holistic or comprehensive approach works best as an overarching strategic framework, against which professionally focused and organisationally devolved interventions can be planned and coordinated.

BOX 18: ACHIEVING SYNERGIES



MARITIME SECURITY

Preventing threats



BLUE ECONOMY

(Sustainability)

Exploiting resources



Maritime Strategies

Maritime Domain Awareness

Marine Spatial planning

Law Enforcement



OCEAN HEALTH

Protecting marine life and diversity



BLUE JUSTICE

Distributing revenues and risks

5.8 Recognise the strengths of different methods of delivery

Capacity building can only be defined very broadly; the measures it should include are debated, if not contested. The capacity building tool-box contains different methods of delivery and it is important to note their specific strengths and weaknesses (see Boxes 19 and 20).

Measures can firstly be distinguished by means of their beneficiaries, which can be governmental, organisational or societal.

They can also be distinguished by means of the **type of capacity** being delivered. This can be material, in the sense of delivering a range of specific capacities from blankets to evidence-collection kits, computers, cars, coastguard vessels, buildings (such as prisons or courts) or entire installations such as port facilities. It can focus on human capacity building, for example through education or training. It may also be institutional in nature, including activities aimed at strengthening organisational structures (such as the management of coastguards), legal provisions (such as drafting national laws), or administrative procedures (such as evidence collection or handover procedures).


Different types of capacity building can have **different time horizons and resource demands**, and entail different strengths and weaknesses. Indicative examples include:

- **Training courses and education programmes.** Training courses inculcate specific operational skills in their participants, such as boat handling, navigation, evidence collection or learning how to swim; institutional procedures, such as handovers or information sharing and norms compliance. Education programmes develop deeper expertise in issue areas, such as maritime law or management. Education programmes and training courses can **strengthen the capacity of agencies to understand, plan for and carry out maritime security activities**. Such activities can sometimes have the **disadvantage of focusing only on a narrow cadre of recipients** (such as English speakers or political appointees), rather than the organisation as a whole. They may also represent a **poor use of resources if recipients later leave their posts** or are sidelined by their superiors. **Matching training with existing resources** is important; training coastguards

BOX 19: BLENDING DIFFERENT MEASURES – THE UNODC'S CAPACITY BUILDING WORK

The UNODC's capacity building work for maritime security emerged from the need to procure effective prosecutions for Somali piracy suspects and to ensure that human rights standards were met. Initially focussed on work in the criminal justice sectors in Kenya and Somalia, it has gradually expanded in scope and today operates the Global Maritime Crime Programme active in over 20 countries worldwide.

UNODC combines different capacity building tools. It conducts short-term training workshops and more intensive extended training programmes; it funds institutional mentors embedded in prisons or maritime security forces; it has provided equipment ranging from blankets for prisoners to furniture or computers and it has built facilities such as prisons and court rooms. UNODC also actively facilitates regional cooperation between law enforcement professionals. The programme is known for its pragmatic, hands-on approach that combines technical expertise with the provision of situation-specific needs. It works with high levels of transparency and reports on all its activities in quarterly, publicly available reports.



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in boat handling and maintenance skills, for example, will have little impact if they have no boats available to use.

- Mentoring.** Mentoring involves the pairing of external advisors and agencies with the aim of offering support, advice and expertise, particularly at leadership level. Mentoring is a long-term activity and requires a relation of trust between mentors and mentees. To succeed, the mentor requires a good understanding of organisational routines and an awareness of their potential to change. When done well, it can **provide an on-going channel for knowledge-exchange** between mentors and mentees, often focused on real-world problems as they arise. Mentoring can be a demanding activity. It requires a **lasting commitment from donors**, and the identification and secondment of **suitable expert mentors** with the ability and commitment to engage substantively with their mentees. Mentors may also require **specialist language and cultural skills**.
- Provision of equipment and infrastructure.** Equipment provision has a number of advantages. It tends to be readily appreciated by recipients. Equipment provides a concrete capacity that can be 'left behind' when the donor leaves and represents a relatively uncomplicated deliverable. Infrastructure provision can represent a visible commitment to capacity building on the part of donors. It can also provide important facilities – such as prisons, courts or ports – that a country may be unable to build or resource themselves. However, the provision of equipment or infrastructure alone **may have little substantive impact if agencies do not have the resources, skills or available personnel to utilise or maintain it**. Consequently, such donations are rarely enough on their own, and should be accompanied by appropriate training activities and integrated maintenance provision.
- Workshops and table-top exercises.** Workshops and table-top exercises can facilitate knowledge-transfer and exchange between donors and recipients. They can also **encourage relationship- and network-building, and are relatively inexpensive** and straightforward to organise. They are also easy to get wrong, however. As with training and education, they can often focus on a small group of English speakers who attend multiple events, at the expense of engaging the organisation more widely. Their **short-term nature** – sometimes lasting only a day or an afternoon – means they **risk being overly generic and insufficiently sensitive** to needs. The relative ease with which they are organised can also lead to multiple different events by different donors, often on very similar or even duplicate subjects. This in turn can saturate the local environment with activity and become a **drain on resources, with personnel attending workshops rather than going to work**. It can also lead to fatigue and cynicism on the part of the recipients themselves.

BOX 20: METHODS OF DELIVERY





6. The way forward

As the international community prepares to realise the Sustainable Development Goals, and the blue economy and maritime security continue to climb higher on the international political agenda, international investment in capacity building grows. Since resources remain limited, it becomes more and more important to consolidate experience. Learning from past experiences and translating lessons from one country and region to another helps to avoid replicating mistakes of the past, enables more effective and efficient work and ensures the long-term sustainability of capacity building.

Mastering the challenges and complexities of maritime security and capacity building requires reflexive practitioners. **Reflexive practitioners challenge their own assumptions** and rely on a careful analysis of the environment and political context in which they operate. They recognise that in maritime security each actor and partner comes from different cultures, whether these are based on nationalities or organisations. **Understandings of how to handle an issue and of what the problem actually is can differ radically.** Blue prints, universal standards and technologies are important tools for reflexive practitioners, but only if they are translated and adapted to actual situations. Such tools, as important as they are, cannot eliminate differences of interest, vision or culture. There is a **need to improvise and experiment**, rather than follow established routines or standard procedures.

The Western Indian Ocean experience offers helpful lessons for maritime capacity builders the world over. The region faces a full range of maritime security challenges, from piracy and trafficking to fishery crimes. At the same time, states in the region increasingly identify maritime resource development and blue growth as important priorities for their wider economic development. International actors have been uniquely active in building maritime security capacity in the region.

If international work was initially a response to the threat posed by piracy off the coast of Somalia, the inter-relationships between maritime insecurities are now well understood, and capacity building projects adopt a wider scope. The Western Indian Ocean has functioned as a crucible of experiment and innovation for maritime security, and it is the lessons learned from these activities that this report has captured.

There is an increasing recognition of the importance of the maritime arena and how it is globally interconnected. Future security capacity builders will need to **better understand the interconnections between maritime security challenges and how they are linked to developments on land.** It is crucial that lessons learned from existing activities are captured and not forgotten. A pathology of earlier initiatives on land is that they become reinvented anew with each new crisis, hotspot or mission. In consequence, there is a wasteful cycle of failure, lesson learning, and consolidation that could be avoided by a more reflexive approach from the outset.

As maritime activity continues to grow, addressing maritime vulnerabilities and insecurities will become a more urgent task. Capacities in many countries, particularly in the Global South, remain weak. The on-going commitment of the international community to assist governments is crucial. Discussions at fora such as the annual Our Oceans conference, or within the Group of 7, Group of 20 and other organisations indicate an increasing willingness to live up to this commitment. Maritime security can only be addressed through collective efforts. This will imply that the **responsibility for carrying out capacity building is moved from the hands of a few into the hands of many.** Capacity building receivers need to become providers. An important benchmark will be whether the number of states and other actors with the expertise required to provide assistance increases during forthcoming years.

Annexes



ANNEX 1: ENDNOTES

- 1 Corbett, J. 2005 [1911]. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, Project Gutenberg, p. 9.
- 2 See Annex 2: Section on Blue Economy.
- 3 See Bueger, C. 2015. *Learning from Piracy: Future Challenges of Maritime Security Governance*, *Global Affairs*, 1(1): 33-42.
- 4 The World Bank. 2013. *The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation*. Washington D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank.
- 5 See Edmunds, T. 2014. *Maritime Security Sector Reform. Lessons from the Mainstream*. Working Paper of the Lessons Learned Project of the CGPCS. <http://www.lessonsfrompiracy.net/files/2014/08/Edmunds-Maritime-Security-Sector-Reform-2.pdf>
- 6 See Voyer, M. et al. 2018. *Maritime Security and the Blue Economy: Intersections and Interdependencies in the Indian Ocean*, *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, online first, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19480881.2018.1418155>.
- 7 See the documentation of lessons from Somali piracy at www.lessonsfrompiracy.net
- 8 For a more detailed analysis, see Bueger, C. and Edmunds, T. 2017. *Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda For Maritime Security Studies*, *International Affairs*, 93(6): 1293–1311.
- 9 See Bueger, C. and Edmunds, T. 2017. *Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda For Maritime Security Studies*, *International Affairs*, 93(6): 1293–1311.
- 10 A discussion of the divergences in understandings of maritime security is provided in Bueger, C. 2015. *What is Maritime Security?* *Marine Policy*, 53: 159-164. See also Annex 2: Section on Concept of Maritime Security.
- 11 See for example the threat assessments conducted in recent maritime security strategies by the EU, France, the G7, Spain and the UK.
- 12 See for example the African Union's maritime strategy, the '2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy', available at http://cggrps.org/wp-content/uploads/2050-AIM-Strategy_EN.pdf
- 13 Source: Bueger, C. 2015. *What is Maritime Security?* *Marine Policy*, 53: 161.
- 14 See Bueger, C. and Edmunds, T. 2017. *Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda For Maritime Security Studies*, *International Affairs*, 93(6): 1293–1311.
- 15 For further discussion and analysis on the blue economy, see Annex 2: Section on Blue Economy.

- 16 The World Bank. 2013. *The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation*. Washington D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank.
- 17 See Bueger, C. 2015. Learning from Piracy: Future Challenges of Maritime Security Governance, *Global Affairs*, 1(1): 33-42.
- 18 For a discussion of the legacy of the principle of ownership and the challenges associated with it, see Donais, T. 2009. Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes, *Peace & Change*, 34(1): 3–26.
- 19 See Bueger, C. 2015. From Dusk to Dawn? Maritime Domain Awareness in Southeast Asia, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 17(2): 157-82; McGuirk, P. et al. 2015. Effective Practices for Interagency Data Sharing: Insights from Collaborative Research in a Regional Intervention, *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 74(2): 199–211.
- 20 See Annex 2: Section on Navies, Coastguards and Law Enforcement.
- 21 See U.S. Department of State. 2010. *Maritime Security Sector Reform guide*. Washington: US Government. See also Annex 2: Section on Maritime Security Sector Reform.
- 22 This analysis draws in part on Bateman, Sam. 2016. Managing Maritime Affairs: The Contribution of Maritime Security Forces, in Jo Inge Bekkevold and Geoffrey Till (eds). *International Order at Sea: How it is Challenged, how it is Maintained*. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 261-282.
- 23 For an introduction to the project logic, see Krause, M. 2014. *The Good Project: Humanitarian Relief NGOs and the Fragmentation of Reason*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 24 Ejodus, F. 2017. EU Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa. Policy Bristol policy briefing 45. Available at: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/media-library/sites/policybristol/documents/PolicyBristol_Briefing_July_2017_EUCAP.pdf; Ejodus, F. 2017. Here is your Mission, now own it! The Rhetoric and Practice of Local Ownership in EU Interventions, *European Security*, 26(4): 470-6.

ANNEX 2: REFERENCES AND GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS

Blue Economy

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). (2015). *Africa's blue economy: A policy handbook*. AddisAbaba: UN Economic Commission of Africa, available from https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/blueeco-policy-handbook_en.pdf

- > *Provides core guidelines for the development of the blue economy sector including a discussion of regulatory needs. Includes case studies from across Africa.*

Michel, James Alix. 2016. *Rethinking the Oceans. Towards the Blue Economy*. St. Paul: Paragon House.

- > *Discusses the concept of blue economy and how it can become a guideline for sustainable economy development in the maritime. Offers a useful definition of the concept and explores a range of case studies.*

Blanc, David Le, Clovis Freire, and Marjo Vierro. 2017. *Mapping the Linkages between Oceans and Other Sustainable Development Goals : A Preliminary Exploration*. DESA Working Paper (149), New York: UN Division for Sustainable Development, available from <https://www.un.org/development/desa/publications/working-paper/wp149>

- > *Maps the interrelationships of targets of the Sustainable Development Goal dedicated to oceans (SDG 14) and other SDGs, drawing on a large number of UN reports as well as scientific publications. Demonstrates the links between SDG14 and security concerns.*

Concept of Maritime Security

Bueger, Christian. 2015. What is Maritime Security?, *Marine Policy* 53: 159-164, available from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2014.12.005>

- > *Discusses different definitions of maritime security and argues that the concept has no universal meaning. Instead the different understandings and contents of the concept need to be investigated in order to improve coordination among actors.*

Bueger, Christian and Timothy Edmunds. 2017. Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies, *International Affairs*, 93(6): 1293–1311, available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix174>

- > *Outlines the core challenges of maritime security and how these manifest themselves. Gives an outline of the innovative responses in the Western Indian Ocean.*

Maritime Security Governance

Shemella, Paul. 2016. Assessing Maritime Governance. In *Global Responses to Maritime Violence*, ed. Paul Shemella. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 88–104.

- > *Describes the concept of maritime governance and the functions it needs to perform paying attention to the role of different bodies and agencies.*

Tardy, Thierry, ed. 2014. *The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). A Lessons Learnt Compendium*. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Report_20_Piracy_off_the_coast_of_Somalia.pdf

- > *Discusses the history and working practice of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, one of the major examples for a successful region coordination mechanism for maritime law enforcement and capacity building.*

Maritime Security Law

Kraska, James, and Raul Pedrozo. 2013. *International Maritime Security Law*. Leiden & Boston: Martinus Nijhoff.

- > *Provides an authoritative overview over the different legal regimes that pertain to maritime security, including a discussion of international environmental law.*

Klein, Natalie. 2011. *Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.

- > *Situates maritime security in the context of the law of the sea and describes duties and rights of states. Traces the impact of legal developments since the early 2000s on the core principles of the law of the sea.*

Maritime Security Strategies

African Center for Strategic Studies. 2016. *The Process of National Maritime Security Strategy Development in Africa*. Washington D.C.: African Centre for Strategic Studies, available from <https://africacenter.org/>

- > *Provides an essential guidance document for the process of drafting national maritime security strategies with a focus on assessment and consultation processes and a discussion of the content a maritime security strategy should capture.*

Shemella, Paul. 2016. Integrated Strategies Against Maritime Violence. In *Global Responses to Maritime Violence*, ed. Paul Shemella. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 71–87.

- > *Discusses the purpose and objectives of strategy making with reference to the maritime domain. Gives an outline of the core elements a maritime security strategy should be comprised of, such as clearly stated objectives and a review of available measures.*

Navies, Coastguards and Law Enforcement

Bateman, Sam. 2016. *Managing Maritime Affairs: The Contribution of Maritime Security Forces*, in Jo Inge Bekkevold and Geoffrey Till (eds). *International Order at Sea: How it is Challenged, how it is Maintained*. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan.

- > *An excellent discussion of the evolving role of coastguards in maritime security, drawing particularly on the experience of the Asia-Pacific region. Covers the roles of maritime security forces, the rise of separate coastguards, reasons for a separate coastguard, and maritime security force models (including single agency, separate agencies and hybrid models).*

Vogel, Augustus. 2009. *Navies versus Coast Guards: Defining the Roles of African Maritime Security Forces*. Africa Security Brief 2009(2), Washington: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, available from www.africacenter.org

- > *Provides a useful discussion of the comparative advantages of coast guards and navies, arguing that many countries would profit from a para-military coast guard under civilian leadership.*

Guilfoyle, Douglas. 2009. *Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- > *An authoritative source providing an integrated analysis of the international laws applicable to maritime law enforcement operations.*

Maritime Domain Awareness

Bueger, Christian. 2015. From Dusk to Dawn? Maritime Domain Awareness in Southeast Asia, *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 17(2): 157-182, 2015, available from <https://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg/account/downloads/get/18222>

- > *Analyses the regional maritime domain awareness system that is evolving in Southeast Asia, which is often taken as a template. Argues that there are benefits in having several overlapping regional centres that can perform different functions.*

Bueger, Christian. 2017. Effective Maritime Domain Awareness in the Western Indian Ocean. Policy Brief 104, June 2017, Institute for Security Studies: Pretoria, <https://issafrica.org/research/policy-brief/effective-maritime-domain-awareness-in-the-western-indian-ocean>

- > *Investigates the evolving structures in the Western Indian Ocean and shows that overlap and competition can be a core hindrance. Argues for a careful balance between low and high tech.*

Doorey, Timothy J. 2016. Maritime Domain Awareness. In *Global Responses to Maritime Violence. Cooperation and Collective Action.*, ed. Paul Shemella. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 124–41.

- > *Provides an overview over the core functions of maritime domain awareness and discusses a range of examples of national and regional centres.*

Maritime Security Issues and Threats

Oceans Beyond Piracy. 2018. Stable Seas Maritime Security Index, available at www.oceansbeyondpiracy.org

- > *The Stable Seas Maritime Security Index is a first-of-its-kind tool that investigates how complex issues like illegal fishing, human trafficking, and other often violent crimes intersect to create a uniquely insecure maritime environment.*

Piracy-studies.org. Web portal for the study of maritime security. Available at www.piracy-studies.org

- > *Contains a broad range of blogs that analyse different maritime security issues and threats in an accessible manner.*

Fishery Crimes

Couper, Alistair, Hance D. Smith, and Bruno Ciceri. 2015. *Fishers and Plunderers. Theft, Slavery and Violence at Sea.* London: Pluto Press.

- > *A major analysis of the relation between fishery and various crimes, including illegal fishery, smuggling and slave labour.*

DeSombre, Elizabeth R. and J. Samuel Barkin. 2011. *Fish.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

- > *An accessible and authoritative introduction to the problems of fishery regulation and governance, including a discussion of core legal provisions and institutions.*

Fish-I Africa. 2018. Website of the non-governmental cooperation project Fish-I Africa, available at <https://fish-i-africa.org/>

- > *Provides a rich resource of reports analysing illegal fisheries, and toolkits for states and cooperation in order to address illegal fishing.*

Maritime Security Sector Reform and Capacity Building

Bueger, Christian. 2014. Counter-Piracy and Maritime Capacity Building: Fallacies of a Debate. Working Paper of the Lessons Learned Project of the CGPCS. <http://www.lessonsfrompiracy.net/files/2014/10/Bueger-Lessons-for-Maritime-Capacity-Building.pdf>

- > *Examines the development of maritime capacity building and the opportunities and challenges it presents. Discusses the distinctiveness of the maritime problem space, as well as issues of definition, expertise, coordination, and ownership.*

Edmunds, Timothy. 2014. Maritime Security Sector Reform: Lessons from the Mainstream. Working Paper of the Lessons Learned Project of the CGPCS. <http://www.lessonsfrompiracy.net/files/2014/08/Edmunds-Maritime-Security-Sector-Reform-2.pdf>

- > *Provides an overview of maritime security and security sector reform. Discusses the key areas in which maritime security sector reform and capacity building can draw on lessons from the mainstream security sector reform literature.*

Safeseas. 2018. Website of the Research Project SafeSeas. A Study of Maritime Security Capacity Building in the Western Indian Ocean, available at <http://www.safeseas.net>

- > *Contains a number of blogs, working papers and country reports that detail capacity building experience in countries such as Seychelles, Djibouti, Kenya and Somalia. Also provides a definition of capacity building, and outline of challenges, the critique of existing tool kits and develops a methodology for assessing maritime security sectors (SPIP).*

Sandoz, John. F. Maritime Security Sector Reform. USIP Center for Security Sector Governance Special Report. Washington: United States Institute for Peace. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2012/05/maritime-security-sector-reform>

- > *Examines the need for maritime security sector governance, examines the need for comprehensive approaches to maritime SSR, and argues that improving maritime governance matters to developing nations, the United States, and a wider range of economic and security partners.*

US Department of State. 2010. Maritime Security Sector Reform Guide. <https://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/othr/misc/151106.htm>

- > *Presents an analytical tool designed to map and assess the maritime sector, to assess existing capabilities and gaps and to facilitate collaboration and coordination to improve maritime safety and security. Draws heavily on the US experience and can be somewhat prescriptive but provides an excellent overview and introduction to MSSR.*

Security Sector Reform

Ball, Nichole. 1998. Spreading Good Practices in Security Sector Reform: Policy Options for the British Government. London: Saferworld. https://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/publications/Spreading_Good_Practices_in_SSR_NB_Saferworld_1998.pdf

- > Provides one of the early frameworks for understanding and implementing SSR. Considers the role of the international community in achieving sustainable change, and the SSR agenda itself, including issues of accountability, transparency, civil society, regional security arrangements and demobilisation and reintegration after conflict.

Edmunds, Timothy. 2013. Chapter 5: Security Sector Reform. In Thomas Bruneau and Florina Matei (eds). The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations. London: Routledge. <http://www.safeseas.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Edmunds-SSR-Routledge-Handbook-2.pdf>

- > Discusses the emergence of the SSR concept and its roots in development, security and civil-military relations. Discusses lessons learned from practice to date, including issues of scope, coherence, goals, and ownership and argues for a problem-driven approach to SSR.

Edmunds, Timothy. 2007. Chapter 2: Security Sector Reform: A Framework for Analysis. In Timothy Edmunds. Security Sector Reform in Transforming Societies: Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro. Manchester: Manchester University Press. <http://www.safeseas.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Edmunds-2007-Ch-2-SSR-A-Framework-for-Analysis.pdf>

- > Presents a framework for analysing and understanding security sector reform. Incorporating a discussion of the history of SSR in concept and practice, and three level approach based around political, organisational and international levels of analysis.

OECD DAC. 2008. The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264027862-en>

- > Provides perhaps the most comprehensive and widely used guide on SSR. Discusses the principles of security system reform, assessment, programme design, capacity building, evaluation, gender mainstreaming and monitoring and evaluation. Also available in French and Spanish.

Sedra, Mark (ed.). 2010. The Future of Security Sector Reform. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation. https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/the_future_of_security_sector_reform.pdf

- > This edited volume presents a practitioner-orientated analysis of SSR efforts in a range of different countries and regions. Includes chapters on the origin and evolution of SSR, together with issues of context, implementation, ownership, justice reform and post-conflict stabilisation.

The authors

Christian Bueger is Professor of International Relations at Cardiff University, Honorary Professor of the University of Seychelles, and a Research Fellow at the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership, University of Stellenbosch. He has published over 80 articles on maritime security, piracy, maritime domain awareness and the Western Indian Ocean. Further information, including free publications, available at <http://bueger.info>

Timothy Edmunds is Professor of International Security and Director of the Global Insecurities Centre at the University of Bristol. He is also Editor-in-Chief of the European Journal of International Security for the British International Studies Association. He has published widely on issues of security sector reform and civil-military relations in the Western Balkans, Western Indian Ocean and elsewhere. Further information is available at <http://www.bristol.ac.uk/spais/people/person/timothy-p-edmunds>

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SAFESEAS

Tackling maritime security is one of the major global challenges today. Safeguarding international transport by sea; preventing accidents and disasters; fighting transnational organised crimes like piracy and the trafficking of narcotics and weapons; addressing fishery crimes and preventing other environmental crimes are all vital for international security and realising the prospects of the blue economy.

Maritime security is a global task. It requires effective maritime security governance at both national and regional levels, but also external capacity building to assist countries in developing their human and material capacities.

Significant investments have been made in maritime security and a rich experience base has been built over the years regarding how to organise maritime security governance and do capacity building work. This report consolidates this experience and identifies best practices to organise maritime security more efficiently and devise ways in which it can be effectively supported by donors. It provides guidelines for mastering maritime security.

Mastering maritime security requires reflexive capacity building. What reflexivity means in practice is demonstrated in this report by drawing on the experience of the Western Indian Ocean region.

The report is an important toolkit for all practitioners involved in maritime security. It also provides an essential guide for the planning, programming and implementation of capacity building for maritime security.



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